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between an EEG cognitive competence profile and cognitive 
performance profiles. 
ABSTRACT  
This paper adopts a competence-performance view of 
cognitive development (Flavell and Wohlwill 1969; Fischer 
1980; Bertenthal, cited Fischer 1981; Bullock, cited Fischer 
1981; Fischer and Silvern 1985) where cognitive competence 
reflects the structure of the individuals' minds and 
cognitive performance is a variable derived from a 
collaboration between individuals and their environments 
(Fischer and Bullock 1984). It is hypothesised that 
cognitive performance profiles reflect the cognitive 
competence component of the collaboration when the learning 
environment is manipulated to induce an individual's best 
performance. 
It is argued that EEG data suggests the location of 
powerful alpha wave generators located in the 
occipital-parietal region of the brain. Energy from these 
appear to be an adequate index of cognitive competence. 
Cross-sectional EEG data (Matousek and Petersen 1973) and 
other neuro-physiological data are interpreted in terms of a 
discontinuous function of the natural logarithm of age, which 
maps skill levels defined by Fischer (1980) and presents as a 
normative profile of cognitive development. 
Patterns of cognitive performances extracted from the 
developmental literature provide evidence of profiles of 
similar form and synchrony to that derived 
neuro-physiologically and this supports the hypothesis. 
Educational considerations implicit in the 
developmental profile suggests a view that decrements in 
cognitive performance can be predicted to occur throughout 
cognitive development. These should be considered as 
corresponding to periods of structural reorganization within 
the brain. The outcome of which is a more effective level of 
cognitive competence which increases that components ability 
to act in future collaborations with the environment, so 
increasing the expectation of the quality of cognitive 
performance outcomes. 
It is suggested that while SOLO levels (Biggs and 
Collis 1982) confound Skill Theory levels the SOLO taxonomy 
provides an appropriate and relatively simple technique for 
evaluating qualitative changes in performance. First, in 
establishing that a new level of competence is attained, and 
secondly, in observing any environmentally induced decline 
from optimal performance. 
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In general, this paper draws a cognitive developmental 
perspective in the tradition of Piaget and focuses on his view 
of how the intellect grows: 
"at any point in its development, it may be 
described as a set of organized structures or 
schemes; as the individual encounters his world, he 
assimilates objects and events to these structures 
(thus they function and expand without structural 
change); when this is not possible the existing 
structures are inadequate, they modify themselves or 
accommodate (thus they undergo structural 
changes).... only occasionally do they result in 
fundamental changes in such structures." Grubber and Voneche (1977,xxvii) 
In particular, the paper adopts a competence-performance 
view of cognitive development where it is assumed that 
cognitive competence reflects the physiological structures of 
the human mind (Flavell and Wohlwill 1969; Fischer 1980; 
Bertenthal, cited Fischer 1981; Bullock, cited Fischer 1981; 
Fischer & Silvern 1985,624). Included among these structures 
are the myelination of nerve fibres, changes to neural pathways 
and the modification of the number and organization of 
synapses. In effect, cognitive competence is seen as placing 
an upper limit, or optimal level, on a person's ability to 
process information (see also, Fischer and Pipp 1984,3). 
Performance, on the other hand, represents a person's 
cognitive behaviour in a specific environment or context. In 
this regard, performance is assumed to reflect a collaborative 
role between the individual's cognitive competence and his 
environment (Fischer and Bullock 1981,1984). The term 
"collaboration" is used to convey the existence of a mutual 
harmony or resonance (Shepard 1984,436) at work between an 
individual's cognitive competence and a particular environment. 
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It is also used as a rejection of the view that either 
cognitive competence or environmental factors dominate to the 
exclusion of the other in the determination of behaviour. 
Through adopting a collaborative approach to cognition the fear 
of preformism often associated with structural theories 
(Flanagan 1984) can be lessened. In addition, it provides a 
mechanism to counter some of the inadequacies of structural 
approaches that lead to purely behaviouristic theories of 
learning. 
In general, the broadest possible meaning can be 
attributed to the term "environment". In view of the suggested 
collaborative nature of behaviour many of its aspects, such as 
emotion, attention and motivation can not be effectively 
thought of in isolation as belonging solely to either the 
individual or to his environment. Fischer (1980,484) proposes 
that the environment for a particular test may consist of a 
piece of physical apparatus. In this paper learning 
environments more appropriate to the collection of performance 
data are considered. Fischer and Pipp (1984,10) suggest that 
the most important environmental considerations leading to 
improved performances are Practice and instruction, as well as 
suPPort through the immediate context of cues, that indicate 
the kind of performances that are expected of individuals. 
Fischer and Bullock (1981,11) support the theory that there is 
an upper bound on performance complexity. In this respect 
optimal performance seems to be a function of both cognitive 
capacity and the optimal, or best environmental conditions 
conducive to the performance. 
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Patterns of change in performance observed over periods 
of time produce developmental performance profiles. These 
profiles are suggestive of a behavioural contract existing 
between individuals and their environments. In view of the 
possibility of such a contract it is hypothesized that 
performance profiles will reflect the cognitive competence 
component of a collaboration between an individual and his 
environment, providing the learning environment is manipulated 
and maintained to induce optimal performance. 
While investigating the idea of behavioural contracts, 
this paper is not committed beforehand to any theoretical 
paradigm beyond the basic collaborative notion. It draws 
ideas, however, from a variety of disciplines; including the 
works of Andersen & Andersson, Bever, Cotman & Neito-Sampedro, 
Epstein, Fischer, Hebb, Lorenz, Luria, Matousek & Petersen, and 
Strauss, among others, wherever they put forward insights that 
seemed valuable, irrespective of the way in which they were 
developed. 
The work of K.W.Fischer constitutes a dominant theme 
throughout this paper. The reason for this is that Fischer's 
theory of cognitive development has as an underpinning, the 
active integration of the individual with his environment, 
whereas Piaget (1971) for example, makes fewer concessions in 
this direction. Another reason is that Fischer's 
mathematically defined levels appear more finely tuned than 
Piaget's stages. Viewed from a different perspective, levels 
have both qualitative and quantitative aspects which permit 
their use as a scale for investigating developmental change in 
performances. Furthermore, there are several dichotomies which 
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have hindered progress towards a comprehensive theory of 
cognitive development, Werner (1957) and Kagan (1985) identify 
some of these dichotomies as: constancy and variation, biology 
and experience, connectedness and discontinuity and, qualities 
and quantities. In Fischer's approach, however, he seldom 
treats the branches of these dichotomies as being opposed to 
each other. Thus new perspectives open out and old data can be 
re-evaluated. 
It is accepted that momentary fluctuations in 
physiological or environmental variables result in transitory 
behavioural changes. However, this paper does not focus upon 
these transitory fluctuations, but rather, upon the long term 
qualitative changes which occur in the central nervous system 
of the human organism and which substantially change its 
competence to act in any further interaction it has with its 
environment. The competence-performance view of cognitive 
development views "competence" as a variable reflecting the 
structure of the organism's mind. It must not be forgotten, 
however, that although the central nervous system may be the 
dominant physiological variable in cognitive development its 
interaction with other systems, such as the endocrine system, 
should not be underrated. The question becomes what does one 
use an index of cognitive competence. 
If learning takes place at the synapse within the 
neurological system as some writers suggest (Hebb 1949; Lorenz 
1977,88; Cotman & Nieto-Sampedro 1982; Kagan 1985), then it 
seems appropriate to seek some physical quantity associated 
with synaptic activity as an index of the changes taking place 
there. 
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Hebb (1949) for example, assumes as a working hypothesis 
that the electroencephalogram (EEG) represents the total 
synaptic activity of the brain when it is poised ready to 
commence processing information. The use of EEG data as an 
indicator of cognitive development has often been suggested 
(Walter 1963; Epstein 1980; Fischer 1983,16), but seldom with 
convincing demonstration. This paper adopts John's (1977) use 
of EEG energy calculations based on Matousek and Petersen's 
(1973) cross-sectional EEG analysis of five hundred and 
sixty-one Swedish children and adolescents. However, it takes 
a different perspective of EEG energy data, in that the data is 
considered as representing a discontinuous function, rather 
than a continuous one. This means that while the percentage of 
EEG alpha energy generally increases there are times when it 
also decreases, thus suggesting some kind of regression in the 
structural development of the brain consistent with the views 
of Werner (1957), Bearison (1974) and Lorenz (1977). In this 
way a rather distinctive pattern, suggestive of changes in 
cognitive competence can be obtained. 
The aim of this paper is to attempt to show that the same 
pattern is reflected in performance data when environmental 
conditions are suitably arranged. It is suggested that the 
pattern of EEG data can be interpreted in terms of the 
mathematical structures reported by Fischer (1980) as 
representing a hierarchy of levels in cognitive development. 
It is also suggested that the changing pattern of EEG energy 
output is focussed on the occipital-parietal region of the 
brain. This offers the possibility that the structural changes 
indexed by EEG energies may be viewed in terms of the 
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simultaneous processing of information which takes place in 
that region of the brein, as suggested by Luria (1976). 
The main concern in this paper is to contribute to a more 
efficient and effective approach to the learning process. If 
we view learning from a competence-performance perspective, 
when provided with a greater knowledge of the limits of 
competence, then the advantage may be in a better predictive 
power of learning outcomes. Furthermore, it might provide a 
better understanding for any intervention in the learning 
process aimed at achieving optimal cognitive outcomes. In this 
way, individuals might be catered for by changing environments 
to accommodate differences among children rather than changing 
children to fit environments (Plomin 1983). 
It is stressed that the correlations to which attention 
is drawn throughout the paper are aimed at encouraging further 
thought and empirical research into the relationships that 
exist between individuals and their environments. 
Unfortunately, much of the data used in this paper is 
cross-sectional and normative, and the correlations should be 
viewed at the most, as normative of populations and not 
prescriptive of any individual. In particular, the need to 
follow up significant correlations with longitudinal studies is 
required to determine if they might be relevant to individuals 
or only groups of people. 
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T SCHER.' S THORETICAL MODEL 
OF COON T T T N.TE DENTELOPMEN T: 
As pointed out in the introduction Fischer's work in 
cognitive development is important with respect to this paper's 
attempt to investigate a relationship between competence and 
performance profiles. Because of this, several of Fischer's 
ideas will be treated in detail. 
Fischer's (1980) main work is Skill Theory which is a 
mathematical model whereby he reconceptualizes cognitive 
development as a transaction, or a series of transactions, that 
takes place between individuals and their environments. 
Through his model Fischer (1980,525) achieves a union of 
behavioural and developmental ideas expressed in the concept of 
"skills", which he defines as "units of behaviour". These 
skills are also characterised by a "standard structural 
description" expressed in terms of simple set theory. 
The structures by their very nature invite an 
investigation to see if they fit an interval scale, as this 
quality is of significance in investigating both competence and 
performance as developmental functions. The structures 
therefore are not simply important because they can be 
interpreted in terms of a collaboration between individuals and 
their environments. Although Fischer uses skills as a scale 
for cognitive development he specifically makes no claims that 
they form an equal interval scale (Fischer and Bullock 
1981,11). By this he means that the temporal distance between 
adjacent levels is not necessarily constant. 
Skill Theory provides a symbolic language which enables 
convenient communication of developmental ideas and permits the 
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defining of developmental sequences and synchronies. As well, 
it enables the description, prediction and explanation of 
actual cognitive skills. Through Skill Theory, Fischer 
attempts to resolve the following questions: 
(i) What is the structure of an individual's cognitive 
skills at any point in development? 
(ii) Which skills develop into which new skills as the 
child moves step by step from infancy to 
adulthood? 
(iii) What is the process by which present skills develop 
into new skills? 
(iv) How do present skills relate to the skills that 
they have developed from? 
(v) Why is cognitive development so often uneven in 
different domains? 
In terms of Skill Theory a set is a "behaviour class" 
over which the individual has control of the source of 
variation in his thoughts and actions. The optimal level of 
skill complexity that an individual can control at any one 
time, is limited by the individual's "single central processing 
capacity" (Fischer & Bullock 1981,11). At its simplest, this 
is a control over a single set, at level 1.('L), or with more 
complexity, control over many sets and the relationships 
between them to provide mastery of higher level skills (Fischer 
1980,482). 
Skills at one level build upon skills from preceding 
levels in a step wise fashion, where each level is 
characterised by fairly well defined structures corresponding 
to the kinds of behaviours controlled at that level (ibid 479). 
The theory proposes a series of ten hierarchical levels divided 
into three tiers corresponding to significantly different 
skills: 
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(i) sensory motor; 
(ii) representational; and 
(iii) abstract. 
One of the main arguments advanced by Fischer is that 
progression through each tier to the next is via a cycle of 
four levels, each represented by specific structures and each 
defined in terms of set theory. The highest obtainable level 
of one tier, a "system of systems", becomes the "single-set" or 
the lowest level of the next. On moving to a new level an 
individual displays a spurt of development as many skills move 
to the new optimal level and an unevenness is observed in 
performance. The length of the interval for which this is 
observed to occur, Fischer suggests, depends on such factors as 
practice, task, content and environmental support (ibid 521). 
It should be noted that according to Skill Theory a new 
cognitive level does not suddenly emerge at maximum capacity 
for all people once they attain a specific age. (Fischer,1980; 
Fischer & Bullock, 1981; Fischer & Pipp,1984b). In order to be 
able to measure the occurrence of a spurt, in particular one 
that reflects optimal performance, many physiological and 
environmental factors need to be either considered or 
controlled. 
At its simplest, the "single-set" in the sensory motor 
tier corresponds to an infant's control of say, grasping or 
• looking or hearing. According to the theory, infants do not 
become stuck on one set, but drift to others and are eventually 
lead to explore the relationships between them. 
A relationship between single sets results in higher 
order skills at level two ('L). This is described in the 
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theory as "mapping"; a structure relating the two sets is 
defined as a collection of ordered pairs in which the first 
member of each pair is from one set e.g. W. and the second 
member is from another set e.g. X. The first set is said to be 
mapped onto the second, i.e.[=-W - °X], under these conditions, 
an infant is able to control and understand the relationship 
between two sets of variations (ibid 486). 
At level three (t), the infant is able to control one 
sensory motor system e.g.at a time. This is achieved when two 
aspects of each action are related to build skills that 
co-ordinate and differentiate types of variations in some means 
and ends situation. In other words one sub-set can be 
processed while the other is kept in mind, so that fine 
variations can be controlled. 
At level four ('L), the infant develops the ability to 
understand objects and the complexity of actions on objects 
independently of his own actions. This he achieves by 
co-ordinating two or more sensory motor systems to form a 
single representational set which it should be noted, is 
different from memory recall or symbolization. The newly 
acquired skill is also defined structually and not 
functionally: - 
L c 	41.D 
As indicated previously 4L is not only the culmination 
of the sensory motor tier, but it is also the generator of the 
first set in the representational tier. Thus, four successive 
levels of change and consolidation have taken place in the 
first two years of an infant's life. 
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Fischer has relied heavily on the research of Emde, Gaensbauer 
& Harmon (1976), Kagan (1979), McCall, Eichorn & Hogarty 
(1977), and Uzgiris (1976) for support in the adoption of these 
four levels of cognition. 
Level five (°L) of the representational tier is achieved 
when one representational set is mapped onto a second. 
Although children at this level are able to carry out 
many different mappings, their understanding of a particular 
problem is still disjointed because of their inability to 
consider two aspects of each set simultaneously. This is 
achieved at level six ( 4q..), when two sub-sets of one 
representation (concrete variable) are related to two sub-sets 
of another representation. Examples of cognition cum 
behaviour, at this level, are most of the Piagetian individual 
conservations. Skills are still limited because objects cannot 
be understood independently of their overt characteristics i.e. 
objects cannot be thought of in the abstract. 
Level seven ( -7L) culminates concrete thought and 
generates the new "abstract tier". Here again the recurring 
cycle of four levels is observed. In this instance 7L has the 
characteristic structures of a representational system of 
systems and also that of a single abstract set; symbolically 
represented: ,R 	,A 
T 	5.  [ 
.7 B4.— 7C 
This implies that a person of about fifteen years should 
be able to control the relationship between two 
representational systems and that they would be able to 
understand how all the changes co-vary. As such this provides 
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them with the skill to be able to control an abstract set. 
Whereas, at L students' skills enabled them to control 
individual conservations, at "1.- they can understand and 
control abstract conservations (ibid 495), which can then be 
generalized to other tasks. At this level students' skills 
include most analogies (Lunzer 1965), political concepts like 
law and society (Adelson 1972) and a few of Piaget's simple 
formal operational tasks (Inhelder & Piaget 1955,1958). 
Little research has been carried out on cognitive 
development beyond the onset of adolescence. However, for this 
tier Fischer proposes sequential levels of development in such 
areas as personal identity, moral judgements and professional 
skills (ibid 496). 
Skill Theory is enhanced by the simplicity of five 
transformation rules which specify how a skill is transformed 
into a more advanced skill. The rules, like levels, are 
defined structually and symbolically in terms of set theory. 
They allow for changes in the organization of behaviour during 
a learning or problem solving experience. These rules are not 
claimed by Fischer to be exhaustive, however, they do provide 
mechanisms for predicting specific sequences of development. 
In effect, the rules provide the theoretical link that 
synthesizes individuals with their environments. In order for 
a transition to occur at all, via one of the transformation 
rules, two skills at the same level of control must have been 
mastered. Then the environment must first ensure that the 
transformation will work, and secondly, provide the opportunity 
for exploration of the relationship between the juxtaposed 
skills (ibid 497,498). 
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Given a careful task analysis the levels and 
transformation rules enable direct predictions about 
developmental sequences and synchronies within a task domain. 
These must be assessed subject to environmental experiences 
which play a central role in determining synchronies. Fischer, 
Pipp and Bullock (1984), emphasize that optimal performance 
will only be reflected in data when children have had the 
opportunity to practice a task in a supportive environment, 
otherwise, their performances will be functioning below their 
optimal capacity. Examples of the kind of environments likely 
to produce optimal performance were given on page two of this 
paper. 
In the broad view, Skill Theory predicts that different 
individuals will follow different developmental paths within 
the same domain. It also predicts that they will develop 
preferentially in different skill domains due to their varying 
environmental experiences. Although the paths may differ, the 
theory predicts that the end products of those paths are skills 
that are equivalent for most purposes (ibid 514). 
Several of the above aspects of Fischer's work give an 
insight to his middle path through the dichotomies of constancy 
and variation, as well as, biology and experience. These of 
course are in addition to the underlying mathematical 
structures of skills having both quantitative and qualitative 
properties. 
Another dichotomy that Fischer and his colleagues 
investigate and report in some detail is connectedness and 
discontinuity. Their middle path through this complex problem, 
simply put, is that there is no necessity to treat continuous 
PAGE 13 
and discontinuous functions as being opposed. For cognitive 
development this means that at times cognitive performances 
will reflect a pattern of continuous cognitive behaviour, while 
at other times, it will reflect a pattern of discontinuous 
cognitive behaviour. Fischer draws attention to an outcome 
from this view and suggests that at times cognitive 
performances will reflect qualitative changes. This of course 
enters into another dichotomy that exists between qualitative 
and quantitative changes in cognitive performances. 
With regard to measuring qualitative changes the problem 
is exacerbated because statistics and Western philosophy, 
favour continuity. Mathematically, an outcome of this is that 
"classical methods of reliability are not appropriate for 
qualitative data because the variable in question is not 
continuously distributed for either true score or error" 
(Appelbaum & McCall, 1983). 
The question arises as to how a qualitative changes in 
performance can be recognized and measured, while overcoming 
the obstacle to simple mathematical treatment of data. Fischer 
and his colleagues (Fischer 1983, Fischer and Bullock 1981, 
Fischer and Kenny (in press), and Fischer, Pipp and Bullock 
1984) discuss two methods for detecting and measuring 
developmental discontinuities. They draw attention to the fact 
that this criterion has not often been used in cognitive 
developmental research (Fischer & Silvern 1985,630). 
In the first method, Fischer and Bullock (1981), Fischer 
and Bullock (1984), Fischer, Pipp and Bullock (1984) emphasize 
the important attributes of the Strong Scalogram method for 
testing developmental sequences. This technique involves the 
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designing of separate tasks to measure each step in a sequence 
to be studied. Students progress through the tasks passing all 
items until a point is reached when they commence to fail all 
subsequent items. To control for developmental unevenness 
Fischer and Bullock (1984,12) stress that all test items need 
to use the same stimuli and procedures. Under such adequately 
controlled conditions it is only the assessed complexity or 
organization of behaviour that varies and hence the complexity 
of behaviour can be measured. In this way the separateness and 
sequentiality of steps in development can be demonstrated. 
While this permits a direct test of developmental spurts it 
also allows for an estimation of the upper limits associated 
with hypothesized cognitive developmental levels (ibid 13). 
This latter aspect of the scalogram technique results 
from a clustering of children at certain steps in a 
developmental sequence and is revealed on analysis as a bimodal 
distribution, when the number of tasks passed is plotted 
against the number of children passing those tasks. 
The second method of detecting developmental 
discontinuities is the method of Multiple Tasks (Fischer, Pipp 
& Bullock 1984,104), which incorporates a different kind of 
continuous scale. Instead of seeking micro-sequences within 
levels a number of items are simply grouped according to the 
capacity demands defined by the level. Scoring is effected by 
noting the number of correct responses to tasks given by each 
individual, for each level, as a function of age. The general 
characteristics of this method are similar to the strong 
scalogram method in that the number of tasks an individual 
passes at a lower level is greater than, or equal to, the 
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number passed at the next higher level. 
This method will be taken up in some detail when 
cognitive performance profiles, derived from test items 
designed by Russell and Fischer (in press), and reported by 
Fischer, Pipp and Bullock (1984) are discussed and compared 
with changes in EEG energy. 
Throughout his work, Fischer places particular importance 
to the patterns of data which are observed during cognitive 
development and are reflected in both brain changes and optimal 
performance. Fischer and Bullock (1981,15) suggest that 
cognitive development can be reconceptualised when the patterns 
of data are viewed in terms of developmental sequences, 
synchronies, and formal developmental constraints. However, of 
specific interest to this paper, Fischer (1983), Fischer and 
Bullock (1984), Fischer and Pipp (1984), and Epstein (1979) 
drew attention to the existence of EEG studies, that reflected 
developmental spurts during age periods for which developmental 
performance spurts were also predicted to occur. 
Although this paper gives a different interpretation to 
the same EEG data derived (John,1977) from Matousek and 
Petersen's (1973) work. It is acknowledged that Fischer's 
analysis of EEG data constituted the catalyst that initiated 
this paper's attempt to interpret EEG data as an index of 
cognitive competence. It is therefore fundamental to this 
paper's attempt to compare the patterns of change in both 
cognitive competence and cognitive performance, when 
environmental conditions are supportive of individuals' best 
efforts. 
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AS AN INDEX 
CDR COGNITIVE COMPETENCE:: 
Throughout the works of Hebb (1949), Lorenz (1977), 
Cotman and Neito-Sampedro (1982), and Kagan (1985), are 
references that associate EEG data with the total synaptic 
activity of the brain. These people often assume a working 
hypothesis that learning takes place at the synapse. In other 
words, learning is associated with events or modifications to 
the chemical or electrical transmissions across the junctions 
between neurons. 
EEG frequencies are reported to change as a developmental 
function of age (Smith 1938; Lindsley 1939; Henry 1944; 
Surwillo 1971, cited Epstein 1979). This paper, however, is 
more concerned with "energies" within specified EEG frequency 
bands, rather than frequencies per se. Energies have been 
calculated and reported by John (1977). These were derived 
from a consideration of the magnitude of electrode potentials 
at particular ages and the spindle shapes of alpha waves using 
the Matousek and Petersen (1973) data. 
An assumption is made in this paper that EEG frequency 
bands appear to reflect a qualitative aspect of synaptic 
activity. In addition, it is assumed that energy within 
selected frequency bands might represent a quantitative index 
of synaptic activity at particular points in time. 
Consequently, in order to build up a cognitive competence 
profile it appears necessary to obtain a quantitative measure 
of synaptic activity as a function of age. In this regard, the 
most likely candidate as an adequate index of functional change 
in activity is energy. 
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Unfortunately, there is little experimental evidence 
available to explain specifically the overall picture of how 
EEG electrical potentials are generated, maintained, or even 
distributed in the human brain. However, if EEG data is to be 
used as an index of cognitive competence, then it is necessary 
to inquire further, to see that a reasonable connection between 
the two can be made. 
Lairy (1976) for example, points out, that most of what 
is known about EEG is based on the assumption that the 
underlying processes are similar in man and in experimental 
animals. Andersen and Andersson (1968; see also Garey 1976; 
Storm Van Leeuwen & Kamp 1980) postulated a mechanism by which 
the thalamus acts as a pacemaker and the primary driving force 
for EEG alpha waves. Alpha waves are rhythmical wave patterns 
recorded by an EEG when electrodes are attached to a person's 
scalp. However, in order for the pattern to be maintained, the 
person must be resting quietly, and not attending closely to 
any stimulus. Under these conditions the brain achieves a 
state of tone, that by analogy can be thought of in terms 
similar to muscle tone which maintains body posture in a state 
for ready action. 
Andersen and Andersson's view of EEG activity also 
suggests a mechanism by which the small amounts of current flow 
produced by single neurons can become functionally coupled 
populations. In this way, their synchronized output seems 
sufficient to account for the magnitude of EEG potentials, 
measured from the scalp. In addition to this, Furukawa and 
Furshpan (1963) draw attention to the possibility of electric 
field effects caused by large populations of synchronously 
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active neurons. They suggest that fields produced by 
individual neurones, orientated parallel to each other, can 
summate to produce gross population potentials. It is 
important to note, that in summation these potentials can 
result in reinforcement or cancellation effects depending on 
their location and orientation (Creutzfeldt 1974,2C-41). With 
this in mind, and looking at the degree of convolution of the 
cerebral cortex, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that a 
very large part of the induced electric fields and potentials 
will cancel out. If this argument is accepted, then there is 
an indication from the pattern of Matousek and Petersen's 
(1973) EEG data that a dominant alpha generator is located in 
the occipital-parietal region of the brain. 
Hori, Hayasaka, Sato, Harada and Iwata (1969) suggest a 
similar view from their research into phase relationships in 
human alpha activity for different regions of the brain. From 
the shape of EEG alpha patterns, with regard to their 
spatio-temporal characteristics, they suggest that alpha 
generators might consist of four oscillating charges. These 
appear to consist of two independent alpha generators, 
orientated at right angles to each other and located in the 
posterior regions of the head. Interestingly, Walter, Rhodes, 
Brown and Adey (1966), from a comprehensive spectral analysis 
of human EEG generators, also suggest that dominant alpha 
generators appear to be located in the posterior regions of the 
brain. 
The implications of this are two fold: first, the 
possibility of two alpha generators in each hemisphere opens 
the way for consideration that they may separately relate to 
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concrete and abstract neuro-physiological structures, and 
secondly, the location of the generators in the 0-P region of 
the brain invites consideration of their function in terms of 
the simultaneous processing of information, as elaborated by 
Luria (1976). 
In many instances (Hagne 1968; Persson 1972; Matousek & 
Petersen 1973), however, normative EEG data is presented for 
interpretation and application, simply as empirical fact. 
The facts are, that minute electrical currents are 
generated in the brain, which can be measured from the brain 
surface. The patterns of data are different for the separate 
states of excitement, relaxation (tone), drowsiness, sleep, 
deep sleep and coma, as well as for brain abnormalities like 
tumours and lesions. In this paper only patterns for the brain 
in tone will be considered, because only under these conditions 
do EEG frequencies and energies present as developmental 
functions with age. Alpha waves, with frequencies .between 7.5 
Hz and 12.5 Hz, which this paper proposes to use as indicators 
of changes in cognitive competence, significantly disappear or 
are blocked when the eyes are opened and attention is focussed. 
Under these conditions, or when the brain is processing 
information, alpha waves are replaced by low voltage, rapid 
irregular waves. 
In the normal brain, rhythmic oscillating waves are 
observed at frequencies of about 0.5 Hertz (Hz) at birth. 
These developmentally increase to about 13 Hz at the age of 
eight to twelve years, when adult patterns start to appear. 
Beta energies at higher frequencies also exist, but they are 
usually low in energy and they do not change greatly, either as 
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a function of age, or of electrode position on the scalp. 
Stewart (1961,27; see, also Encyclopaedia Britannica 
1978,111,636) suggests that they correspond more with the 
sensory motor regions of the brain, while Hill and Parr 
(1963,86) suggest that their changes are in phase with changes 
taking place at alpha frequencies. Matousek & Petersen (1973) 
suggest that at about twenty-two years of age some seventy 
percent of all EEG energy detected at the scalp is at the alpha 
frequency. 
This paper follows Matousek and Petersen's (1973) 
division of continuous EEG frequencies into qualitatively 
distinct wave bands, noting that their sample has an age range 
from one through twenty-two years: delta = 1.5 - 3.5 Hz, 
theta = 3.5 - 7.5 Hz, alpha-1 = 7.5 - 9.5 Hz, alpha-2 = 9.5 - 
12.5 Hz, beta-1 = 12.5 - 17.5 Hz, and beta-2 = 17.5 - 25 Hz. 
The treatment of the data in this way is similar to our 
qualitative understanding of colours from their continuous wave 
lengths in the range of 400 to 700 nanometres. In effect, it 
appears to overcome some of the dichotomies mentioned 
previously of qualitative change being opposed to quantitative, 
and continuity being opposed to discontinuity. Even though 
some sensitivity may be sacrificed by considering frequencies 
in broad bands, it enhances the psychological and physiological 
interpretation of EEG data. For this reason the reanalysed 
data in this paper particularly supports Matousek and 
Petersen's (1973) division of the alpha frequency band, into 
separate alpha-1 and alpha-2 bands, and gives developmental 
significance to these bands in terms of concrete and abstract 
development. 
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The over-all picture of alpha generation as a 
developmental function is not quite that simple, because 
amplitudes (property of a wave proportional to its energy) 
observed as scalp potentials may result from increases in the 
intensity or density of synaptic input to the neuronal 
populations involved. On the other hand, the changes could be 
a consequence of increases in the size of the neuronal 
populations themselves. These matters must be considered 
before confidence can be placed in the idea that EEG data may 
be a reasonable index of cognitive competence. 
In selecting an EEG data base, Matousek and Petersen's 
(1973) published results appeared to be an obvious choice, for 
several reasons: 
i) the sample has an extensive age range; 
one year to twenty-two years 
ii) they claim sufficiency for obtaining statistically normative data, in terms 
of size, physiological and 
psychological criteria 
iii) their results are reported in both 
absolute and relative quantities 
iv) the alpha frequency band is analysed 
as two contiguous bands, and 
v) electrode potentials have been converted to energies (John 1977). 
Most other sources of available EEG data (Smith 1938; 
Lindsley 1939; Henry.1944, Surwillo 1971; cited Epstein 1979) 
report frequency as a function over a limited age range. In 
other cases, data has been obtained from combinations of 
electrode positions which prevent meaningful comparison among 
studies. 
Matousek and Petersen (1973) reported EEG data obtained 
from objective measurements and analysis of broad-band 
frequencies, for normal children (218 females & 183 males) and 
adolescents (85 females & 75 males). Eight channels of the 
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electroencephalograph were used for EEG data collection, while 
the other two channels were used for recording eye movements. 
In this way, it could be ensured that the visually selected 
sections of wave data from a thirty minute period represented 
the patterns for a brain in tone. From this mass of data six 
sections each of ten seconds duration were analysed and 
averaged for age intervals of a year. EEG recordings were 
obtained from seven pairs of leads (F7-T3, F8-T4, T3-T5, T4-T6, 
P3-01, P4-02 and CO-C4) attached to specific locations on the 
scalp. Data from electrodes were processed by means of a 
broad-band analog frequency analyser into the six frequency 
bands listed on page 21. Throughout their data collection 
Matousek and Petersen reported that explicit controls of 
filters and integrators were maintained. In addition to this, 
regular calibrations and analyses of EEG signals were carried 
out to avoid extraneous effects imposing on the data (ibid.77). 
Averages and standard deviations for individual age groups 
were given and a correlation matrix with labeled significance 
limits for the whole material, as well as for each EEG 
electrode position were computed and reported. 
Matousek and Petersen's (1973,82) data analysis reflects 
the predominance of delta, theta and alpha frequency bands 
during specific ages. Delta activity predominates from birth 
and tends to decline most rapidly in the course of growth while 
continuing to be present in early adulthood. Theta activity 
increases from birth and predominates during infancy. It then 
declines, but continues to have a presence throughout the 
sample tested. Alpha activity slowly increases from birth and 
rapidly gains predominance during early childhood. It then 
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becomes a permanent phenomenon throughout the entire lifetime 
of the adult. Matousek and Petersen's findings concur with 
those reported by Walter (1953, cited Lairy 1975) and Stevens 
(1968, cited Lairy 1975). Stevens (ibid.), however, goes 
further, and draws parallels between increased brain weight, 
the rate of increase in EEG frequencies and the stages of 
intellectual development elaborated by Piaget. In addition to 
the above, Matousek and Petersen (1973,93) draw attention to 
the existence of fundamental differences in alpha patterns for 
children and adolescents. In view of this, they divided the 
alpha frequency band into two discrete contiguous bands, 
alpha-1 and alpha-2, which reflect age dependent changes. For 
adolescents sixteen through twenty-two years, changes are 
slowing down and EEG parameters reflect logarithmic dependency 
on age, which contrasts with a linear dependency observed for 
children. 
From their data Matousek and Petersen derived an empiric 
expression: THETA/(ALPHA + 8), which gave them the best 
correlation (r=-.742, for children and r=-.248, for 
adolescents) between EEG potentials, derived from various 
positions on the scalp and age. However, it is suggested that 
the transformation of data into this expression has the effect 
of substantially reducing its discontinuous nature, in regard 
to its relationship with age. 
In general, and for most electrode positions, it can be 
seen from Matousek and Petersen's data that theta potentials 
correlate negatively with age. Furthermore, alpha potentials 
which predominate throughout most of Matousek and Petersen's 
study correlate positively with age, as might be predicted from 
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previous studies. However, their transformation of data from 
these two frequency bands results in a negative correlation. 
Further to this, and as mentioned previously, Hill & Parr 
(1963,94) can be interpreted to suggest, that the pattern of 
theta data presents as a spatial, causal harmonic of alpha data 
during its period of predominance. In other words any peaks or 
troughs occurring in one set of data are likely to be in phase 
with peaks and troughs occurring in the other. Hence, when 
this is considered in the transformation, THETA/(ALPHA + 8), 
the result is a smoothing of the appearance of the data which 
is reflected in an improved correlation coefficient. Weighting 
the denominator of the expression tends presumably to enhance 
the smoothing effect as well. Overall, it is suggested that 
the transformation forces the data to appear as a continuous 
function, whereas it might be better represented by a 
discontinuous function. 
Part of the difficulty of interpretation of Matousek and 
Petersen's work arises from their forcing data to fit a 
continuous function. Another part arises from a lack of an 
adequate interpretation of the fact that absolute EEG alpha 
energy may decrease significantly with age, whereas alpha 
energy expressed as a percentage of the total energy recorded 
from the brain (relative alpha energy) increases significantly 
with age. In effect Matousek and Petersen present their data, 
in both absolute and relative terms and leave the decision to 
the users to decide which is more suitable for their particular 
purposes. FIGURE 1. shows absolute alpha energy as a function 
of age. It also shows how the energy is distributed between 
the alpha-1 and alpha-2 frequency bands, as a function of age. 
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A REINTERPRETATION 
OF EEG DATA: 
The suitability of EEG as an index of cognitive 
competence appears to depend on a successful reinterpretation 
of available data, particularly in terms of the differences 
between absolute and relative energies, mentioned in the 
previous chapter. In this regard, data calculated by John 
(1977) from Matousek and Petersen (1973) were graphed. This is 
shown in FIGURE 1. The graph of total alpha energy is complex 
and presents uniquely when compared with curves for other 
frequency bands. Generally, these tend to decline 
logarithmically during the period of alpha predominance, but 
appear to increase from time to time in phase with major events 
occurring in the alpha band. This paper suggests that the very 
nature of the bimodal curve of total alpha energy (FIG.1) 
invites the investigation of alpha as two contiguous frequency 
bands. In fact Matousek and Petersen did just this. 
Relative alpha energy from the 0-P region of the scalp, 
is presented in FIGURE 2. It was obtained by plotting energies 
(John 1977) for mid interval ages, but it has not been drawn 
point to point, as the points are not sufficient to give a 
picture of the variation of the function. Rather, a more 
reasonable course of smoothing curves through the points to 
give a clearer, simpler representation of the possible 
behaviour of the function has been given (see also McQueen 
1982). 
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The significant feature to note in FIGURE 2. is that 
relative alpha energy, that is, alpha energy as a percentage of 
total EEG energy output, generally increases developmentally, 
at least to twenty-two years of age. Prima facie, it presents 
as a developmental function worthy of further investigation. 
It should also be noted that the line is not smooth. It 
displays the form of a complex sinusoidal curve and its 
apparent discontinuous form leads one to an interpretation that 
the relative alpha energy not only increases, but from time to 
time declines. This decline can perhaps be interpreted as a 
decline in the total synaptic output of the alpha generators. 
It should also be noted that the absolute energy curve 
(FIG.1) is fundamentally different from the relative alpha 
energy curve (FIG.2). For both graphs the electrodes are 
located for maximum energy output at the occipital-parietal 
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position on the scalp. In neither case, absolute or relative, 
have the differences between these curves been adequately 
interpreted in the literature. 
A synthetic curve, FIGURE 3. represents the equation 
y = Ln(x) + n.sin(x) + n.cos(x) - n/2.sin(2x) - n/2.cos(2x), 
(where n =.018). 
FICTuRE 3. 	A SYNTOETsCALLY PRoaucE6 CAAMIE. 
This curve was produced by using a modification to the L3-GRA 
function option, of the Graphs and Charts software package 
(Harding/Acornsoft Ltd.1982). A guided discovery approach was 
used and the curve was found to consist of three fundamental 
components, a natural logarithmic curve and two oscillating 
curves. A Fourier series was then considered and as more 
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harmonic terms of the series were included the approximation 
became better. The curve FIGURE 3. represents the summation of 
the first four harmonic terms of the series, integrated with a 
natural logarithmic function. A comparison of this curve with 
the relative energy curve FIGURE 2. suggests that they appear 
to have many characteristics in common. 
This paper suggests that the natural logarithmic aspect 
of the curve is a manifestation of "growth", in that the rate 
of increase of relative alpha energy, in the long term, is 
proportional to relative alpha energy itself. In this respect 
it is common with many other biologically determined, natural 
logarithmic functions. The two oscillating components of the 
curve can be interpreted as supportive of the division of alpha 
frequencies into the two separate contiguous bands. They also 
add support for the concept of two dominant alpha generators 
being located in each hemisphere in the 0-P region of the 
brain. The curve in FIGURE 3. is less complex than the one for 
relative alpha energy at 0-P (FIG.2). This is because the 
variable in each of the components continues to increase. 
However, inspection of the relative energy curve reveals a 
change in the pattern in the region of the peak at thirteen 
years. This corresponds to the time when relative alpha-2 
energy surges and becomes predominant, while relative alpha-1 
energy momentarily declines. This is taken as an indication 
that alpha-1 and alpha-2 are not harmonically related and are 
at least partially independent of each other. 
The assumed independence of these two hypothetical 
generators has a major bearing on the interpretation of 
absolute energies in terms of neuro-physiological structural 
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changes and cognitive competence. 
From the above 'reinterpretation of relative alpha energy 
data (John 1977) it appears a reasonable hypothesis that EEG 
data can be adequately represented as a discontinuous function 
of age. The same data has been analysed from a point to point 
perspective and graphically presented by Epstein (1980) and 
again by Fischer(1983) and Fischer and Pipp (1984) to present a 
series of developmental spurts in the EEG. However, Fischer and 
Pipp's analysis and presentation is slightly different from 
Epstein's, in that they calculate annual, rather than biennial, 
increases in relative alpha energy. FIGURE 4. presents the 
data for annual increases in relative alpha energy plotted for 
mid interval ages. 
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Fischer (1983,16) suggests that the "data (FIG.4) show an 
impressive correlation between the modal ages for the 
developmental levels and ages of spurts in brain wave changes". 
Fischer interprets the peaks (FIG.4) as the time when spurts in 
brain wave change are initiated, while Epstein (1979) also 
attempts to correlate these with spurts in brain growth. 
If we take an over-view of the relative alpha energy 
curve (FIG.2) as a discontinuous function of age then these 
hypothesized growth spurts (Epstein 1979) are likely to be 
located in the troughs. In other words maximum brain growth 
would be associated with the troughs, while minimum growth 
would be associated with the peaks, (in the next chapter it 
will be argued that evidence for a correlation between brain 
growth spurts and EEG energies does not exist), however, it is 
not "growth" per se, but functional change in EEG generators 
that must be considered, relevant to a competence profile. In 
this regard the troughs, (FIG.2) while indicative of 
developmental spurts (Fischer 1983) are associated with lower 
EEG values. This presumably means that spurts in cognitive 
development and EEG energy which are predicted to concur are 
different, in the regard that maximum cognitive 'developmental 
change appears to correlate with lower EEG energies, while 
minimum cognitive developmental change appears to correlate 
with higher EEG energies. 
It is argued that when absolute alpha energies are 
considered the troughs (FIG.2) are far more complicated in 
terms of neuro-physiological structural changes than the peaks. 
In this view, many of the anomalies to which Fischer (1983,16) 
draws attention and which are associated with the peaks in 
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FIGURE 4. may be lessened, if instead attention is focussed on 
the troughs. 
Many theories of cognitive development focus on the ages 
of "emergence" of new cognitive stages or levels and there is 
some agreement among some theories on the modal ages for these 
spurts. In view of the above, it is proposed to define a level 
of cognitive development, not in terms of the age of its 
emergence, but rather in terms of the age of maximum EEG alpha 
energy associated with a developmental spurt. In other words 
if levels exist and they are associated with structural changes 
indicated by the energy of synaptic output, then peak EEG 
energies are assumed to define levels (peaks in FIGURE 2, and 
troughs in FIGURE 4). 
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It is shown in FIGURE 5. (for the period of alpha 
predominance, following the sensory motor period) that when the 
relative alpha energies for the Peaks alone are plotted as a 
function of age, the points regress to a natural logarithmic 
curve. This curve relates only to peak alpha energies, 
therefore energy may be interpreted as a discontinuous function 
of age. On further analysis the data can be presented in 
linear form as shown in FIGURE 6. 
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The following equation can be written to represent the straight 
line in FIGURE 6: 
= k.ln(AGE) - c 	(r=.997) 
where both k and c are constants and the left hand side of the 
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equation is relative peak alpha energy. The values of the 
constants have little, meaning because of the discontinuous 
nature of the relationship. The function, however, clearly 
relates relative peak alpha energies to specific ages during 
development. In as much that these ages are logarithmic this 
paper suggests that peak alpha energies appear as a function of 
natural growth. If their appearance can be shown to occur at 
particular ages for the human species, as a whole, then there 
is a basis to suggest that they might be genetically embedded. 
Immediately the spectre of preformism arises. It is suggested, 
that such a spectre need only cause concern if the function had 
been continuous. As it is not, it questions, what is happening 
to the brain during the trough periods between alpha peaks. It 
seems that this may be the period during which the environment 
has the opportunity to play a major role in collaborating with 
existing competence structures. 
In view of the way levels have been defined and given a 
reasonable interpretation of FIGURE 4. as perhaps indicating 
modal ages for cognitive developmental spurts, it is tempting 
to make an a priori assumption to equate peak alpha energies 
with Skill levels, as defined by Fischer (1980): 
A'g. E(7.-ALr'HA) = ''' L, 	(L = Fischer's skill levels). 
This can be viewed as an attempt to observe the effect of 
assuming that Skill levels might constitute an equal distance 
interval scale. As alpha energy rises abruptly following the 
sensory motor period of cognitive development, the first alpha 
peak is equated to skill level four, the next alpha peak to 
level five, and so on. 
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In FIGURE 7. Skill level plotted as a function of age is 
presented. 
From this graph the following equation is obtained: 
Level = .2575 Age + 3.4869 	(r=.999); 
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From a different perspective, FIGURE 7. can be considered as a 
collapsing of the ordinate axis of the graph in FIGURE 2. 
Previously this axis expressed relative alpha energy on a 
continuous scale. In FIGURE 7. the ordinate scale represented 
qualitative skill levels which were structurally defined by 
Fischer (1980), and mathematically separated by one unit in a 
hierarchy of set theory structures. In view of the logarithmic 
nature of the relationships expressed in FIGURES 5. & 6., the 
linear function expressed in FIGURE 7. clearly correlates (not 
necessarily functionally) Skill levels and peak alpha energies. 
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The linear function, therefore, appears to support the 
a Priori assumption that Skill levels might form an equal 
interval scale. On further investigation it is found that: 
F.E( -A-AL.F.HA) = -92.9 + 76.55 ln(L) 	(r=.986); 
The data can be regressed marginally better to a parabolic 
function, but for practical purposes the above linear equation 
is a reasonable representation of the relationship. 
Keeping in mind two things, first, that this function is 
based on relative alpha energy and secondly, that alpha-1 and 
alpha-2 energies display individual developmental patterns. 
Then the above equation can also be interpreted to suggest that 
cognitive development may reflect an integration of both 
alpha-1 and alpha-2 energies. The data also suggest that their 
influence during their individual periods of predominance may, 
in part, reflect the other non-predominant component. If this 
is so, then it may well account for some anomalies which are 
observed to occur in performances. In particular, when 
children give isolated demonstrations of behaviour a level or 
so in advance of the structures they can control. 
To change the focus of reinterpretation from relative 
energy to absolute energies, absolute EEG values (as mean 
amplitudes in micro volts) for each frequency band are 
presented graphically for the occipital-parietal, temporal, 
central and fronto-temporal regions of the brain (Matousek & 
Petersen 1973). These data are shown in FIGURES 8. through 11. 
Several features are noticeable when the separate regions of 
the brain are compared. First, the degree of complexity is 
greatest in O-P regions. Complexity decreases via the temporal 
(FIGURE 9.) and central (FIGURE 10.) regions, to the 
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fronto-temporal region (FIGURE 11.). Unfortunately data is not 
available for the frOntal and prefrontal lobes alone, where the 
pattern of data reflect similar features to those displayed in 
the relative alpha energy curve (FIGURE 2.), in terms of the 
location of peaks and troughs. 
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In the fronto-temporal lobe, FIGURE 11. the absolute 
energy in each band appears to logarithmically decrease as a 
developmental function of age. It also appears that the peaks 
for separate frequency bands are in phase with each other (see 
also, Chatrain & Lairy 1975; Hill & Parr 1963,94). These 
peaks, it appears, can be progressively traced back through the 
central (FIGURE 10) and temporal (FIGURE 9) regions of the 
brain to major events taking place at alpha frequencies in the 
0-P region. This focuses attention on the 0-P region of the 
brain as the site of alpha activity and adds support to the 
alpha generators being located there. 
The order of dominance of frequency bands at any point in 
time in the F-T region of the brain is the same as the order of 
frequency predominance as a function of age, with alpha 
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energies being respectively the lowest and latest. In the F-T 
region of the brain the bands are clearly separate. It is 
tempting to suggest that their order reflects their 
evolutionary history and their fundamental importance to the 
survival of the species (see Turko, Giurintano, Giurintano & 
Andy 1974). If the pattern follows, then it might be 
conjectured that delta energies index reflex action levels 
during fetal development. In other words energies at this 
frequencY may reflect developmental peaks and troughs, 
indicating changes in development. Hagne (1968), Hagne, _ 
Person, Magnusson and Petersen (1973), and Kagan (1982) report 
EEG changes at theta frequencies which they suggest reflect 
developmental levels in sensory motor actions. In a similar 
way, it is suggested, that perhaps at alpha-1 frequencies, 
energies index the preoperational and concrete levels of 
cognitive development. Furthermore, at alpha-2 frequencies, 
energies might index abstract levels of cognitive development. 
If it could be shown that theta, alpha-1 and alpha-2 energies 
correlate with periods of sensory motor, concrete and abstract 
cognitive development, then this would appear supportive of the 
stages of cognitive development elaborated by Piaget. 
The absolute energy data as a whole focuses attention on 
the 0-P region of the brain (FIG.8) as the region of complex 
EEG generation for the period of alpha predominance. There is 
a significant increase in alpha-1 energy at the end of the 
sensory motor period which is also the commencement of the 
concrete operational period (level 4, Fischer 1980). It is 
suggested that the end of the sensory motor period can be 
recognized in FIGURE 8, by a theta energy peak at approximately 
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two and a half years of age. This energy rise is the most 
significant increase for any frequency band in any electrode 
position for the human EEG. It presents as a unique, dominant 
peak in 0-P and corresponds in time with the obscure Piagetian 
stage (lacking structure d'ensemble) of pre-operationalism as 
well as with Fischer's (1980) 'L. If it is accepted that 
energies at delta and theta frequencies react in phase with 
changes in alpha energies then it is suggested that the maximum 
theta peak observed to occur at this time in 0-P, is perhaps a 
manifestation of alpha. Thus, the "real" theta peak, which is 
predicted to occur at the end of the sensory motor period is 
more correctly located, at 'L, where it occurs in F-T data, 
FIGURE 11. 
From level five, alpha-1 energy declines and then peaks 
again at about nine and a half to ten years. It is suggested 
that this corresponds to Fischer's L. 
The curve (FIG.8) declines from 6t- to peak again at about 
eleven and a half years of age. The following idea is 
hypothesized to account for this sequence of events. In the 
over-all view of the logarithmic nature of EEG development (see 
for e.g. FIG.3), the processes underlying it are commencing to 
slow down. This can be seen graphically as a flattening out of 
the curve to the extent that many of the changes that may have 
been obscured during the period of rapid change in alpha 
energy, can now be seen. This paper suggests that the decline 
and subsequent rise in the EEG curve corresponds to a period of 
structural reorganization within the neurons of the 0-P region 
of the brain. It is suggested that '6 L_ is first attained at 
about ten years of age and during neural reorganization the 
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level is temporarily lost, to be regained again at about eleven 
and a half years of age. This can be interpreted as "a 
regression in the cause of development" and is reflected as a 
disequilibrium between accommodation and assimilation. 
The interpretation this paper assumes for a level, 
indexed by an EEG peak, is that an equilibrium exists between 
the structures of accommodation (acm) and the structures of 
assimilation (asm). Fischer (manuscript in preparation), 
describes the processes of accommodation and assimilation as: 
an interaction between the schemes that a person 
applies to a situation and the adjustments that the 
situation requires in the schemes. Assimilation 
refers to an organism's active attempts to apply 
particular schemes to things and events in the world, 
and accommodation refers to the adjustment of those 
schemes to the characteristics of the thing to be 
known. Thus the contribution of the scheme to 
knowing is called assimilation, and the contribution 
of the situation or object is called accommodation". 
For example at the 6q_ peak, an equilibrium is assumed to be 
achieved: 	dq,cm 	, which on reorganization is 
lost. The resultant disequilibrium can be thought of in terms 
of temporarily weakened assimilative structures: 
[I 8LAcm 	41-AH] such that, 
116LAcm > .eq._0:]. When the peak at eleven and a half 
years is achieved, level six equilibrium is once again 
attained. Given a supportive environment (see page 2), these 
structures should thereafter be available to be called upon and 
displayed in behavioural performances. It is suggested that 
this pattern continues for levels through to ten. 
At about twelve years of age alpha-1 energy has declined 
(FIG.8) to be superseded by energy at the alpha-2 frequency 
band. This peaks at about thirteen years of age, and 
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corresponds in time with Fischer's (1980) '7 1— This peak can be 
seen as the dominant right peak in FIGURE 1. It not only 
signals the end of concrete operations, but heralds the 
commencement of the period of abstract operations. In 
Fischer's (1980) structural terms this peak corresponds to 
concrete control over a system of systems and also constitutes 
the first element of an abstract set. 
Having peaked, alpha-2 energy abruptly declines and 
equally abruptly re-peaks at fifteen and a half years of age 
(FIGS.1 & 8). This appears to be one of the most dramatic 
reorganizations that takes place through-out EEG development 
and can be detected as a trough in FIG.4. Level seven 
equilibrium is first achieved at thirteen years, regresses, and 
is finally regained and controlled at fifteen and a half years 
of age. While this reorganization takes place, it is suggested 
that level eight structures commence to emerge. The over-all 
effect of this, particularly in a non-supportive environment, 
is likely to be a period of confused behaviour, with some level 
six, but mostly levels seven and eight performances being 
demonstrated from thirteen through fifteen and a half years. 
The pattern continues for levels eight and nine (FIG.8), 
where upon the energy levels decline to a point where data 
cannot be reliably interpreted. However, after level nine, 
alpha energy levels continue to increase. It is hypothesized 
that the pattern will continue, and therefore accord with 
Fischer's level ten. In like manner, it is hypothesized that 
the three energy peaks detected at theta frequencies by 
Hagne(1968) and Hagne, Person, Magnusson and Petersen's (1973) 
and given cognitive developmental significance by Kagan (1982), 
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might correspond to the first three Skill levels defined by 
Fischer (1980). 
It should be noted that the degree of phase dependence of 
delta and theta on alpha is not observed for alpha-1 on alpha-2 
or vice versa. In view of this it is suggested that alpha-1 
and alpha-2 develop relatively independently of each other. 
However, the data can be interpreted as suggesting that their 
effect is to some degree compounded, especially during the 
period corresponding to mid-to-late concrete operations, where 
both alpha-1 and alpha-2 energy levels are high. 
It was previously suggested that stages or levels of 
development that focussed on the "emergence" of a spurt, did so 
on the periods of cognitive development that seemed, from EEG 
data, to be the most complicated. The degree of complication 
can now be expressed as possibly the reorganization of some 
structures, the emergence of others, and a compounding of these 
with structures already existing. It needs to be shown, 
however, that reasonable neuro-physiological explanations are 
available to support this view. 
In view of the observed decrements in EEG energies, the 
complexities surrounding the emergence of a new 'level also need 
to be considered in terms of the reorganization of structures, 
to the "equivalence" of the previously controlled level. 
Neuro-physiologically the new structures are going to be 
different to those from which they evolved. However, it needs 
to be considered whether, at a point rising from a trough 
(FIG.2), the structures for mathematical and practical purposes 
are likely to resemble earlier structures. For example in 
FIG.8, it seems reasonable that the mathematical structure 
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Fischer (1980) attributed to level seven will for practical 
purposes in analysing behaviour, suffice for the EEG peak 
observed at thirteen, as well as the peak at fifteen and a half 
years of age. To assess this, it will be necessary to consider 
the underlying structure of performances controlled at these 
times. 
It is suggested that an integration of the above ideas 
involving both relative and absolute EEG-alpha energies might 
provide an index from which a profile of cognitive competence 
can be derived. From EEG data, FIGURE 12. suggests what a 
profile of cognitive competence may look like. 
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It is assumed that cognitive competence places an upper limit 
on cognitive performance. If this is so, then the profile 
should be reflected in the patterns of cognitive performance. 
Providing environmental conditions are suitable. 
The profile immediately suggests the question, what is 
happening to the brain that results in decreased EEG energy 
out-put. For the profile to be meaningful a reasonable 
explanation must be found. 
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EVIDENCE CONS I S TENT WI TH 
A PROF ILE OF D I SCONT INUOUS 
COIGN I T I VE COMPETENCE 
Physiological structures of the brain are assumed to be 
reflected in cognitive competence. Thus, cognitive competence 
is viewed as placing an upper limit on the maximum possible 
level of performance an individual can produce in collaboration 
with his environment. 
In the previous chapter it was suggested that EEG alpha 
energy may have potential to index cognitive competence. From 
Matousek and Petersen's (1973) data a profile of alpha energy 
was presented as a possible profile of cognitive competence. 
However, the profile is discontinuous in the respect that the 
general increase is from time to time interrupted, 
corresponding to periods of alpha energy decline. It needs to 
be seen that such decreases in the profile can be reasonably 
justified from a consideration of what is known, or suggested, 
might be occurring to brain structures during their 
development. 
Rousseau (1712-1778), opens his work "The Social 
Contract" with the words: "man was born free, and he is 
everywhere in chains". With regard to a behavioural contract  
the emphasis is reversed, for it is more appropriate to suggest 
that "man is conceived in chains, and he is everywhere free". 
The chains of his conception are the double helices of the DNA 
molecule. Daunting as this may sound, it is at a very early 
stage of cell division that the environment collaborates in 
cell differentiation. Lorenz (1982,257) suggests that the 
genetic program stakes out the limit of what is possible and an 
"open program" (Mayr 1942, cited Lorenz 1982,258) enables the 
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organism to gain mastery over various changes in an unstable 
environment. This appears to be a reasonable suggestion both 
in terms of the results of embryological experiments (Lorenz 
1982,295) and from what is known to occur in post natal neural 
development, where changes appear to be both environment 
dependent and environment expectant (Reinis and Goldman 
1980,308). 
Both EEG and neuro-physiological considerations focus 
attention concerning competence on the O-P region of the brain. 
In this respect, Blauenstein et al.(1977), Meyer et al.(1978), 
and Gur et al.(1980) show from in vivo human cerebral blood 
flow measurements that the sub-dominant hemisphere of the brain 
and the parietal lobes of both hemispheres reflect lower ratios 
of grey to white matter, compared to the rest of the cortex. 
These same regions correspond with higher out-puts of EEG alpha 
energies (Matousek & Petersen 1973). Consequently, although 
grey matter is traditionally associated with EEG energies, this 
paper suggests that both grey and white matter are required to 
produce the kind.of powerful alpha generators envisaged for the 
O-P region of the brain (see also Hill & Parr 1963,19). 
Oscillating waves like those exhibited for alpha spindles could 
be produced if a large synaptic effect (grey matter) functions 
as a capacitor when positioned in series with uniformly 
orientated bundles of myelinated fibres (white matter). In 
effect, the fibres would function as an induction coil. Under 
these conditions, it is suggested that the synaptic effect 
would build up to maximum firing potential. During this time, 
the electric field strength would decline. On firing, the 
synaptic potential would drop to zero while the field strength 
PAGE 49 
increased to its maximum before declining again. A repetition 
of this would produce a series of oscillating signals. 
The connection between the synapse and EEG has often been 
demonstrated. It is simply not possible to obtain in vivo 
developmental data from human brains that will in any way be 
representative of a normative sample. It is necessary to 
•extrapolate from animal studies. Kandel (1970,60) reports that 
in all tests involving the plasticity of synaptic pathways a 
change in synaptic energy has been detected. However, the 
connection between the modification of synapses and learning, 
which as mentioned above, was often assumed as a working 
hypothesis, lacks a wealth of empirical support. Some evidence 
does exist (Glaser 1963), and in particular Kandel (1970,57) 
discusses a combination of cellular and behavioural techniques 
which he used to relate synaptic modifications in certain nerve 
cells of an invertebrate to short-term modification of 
behaviour. In another example, Tsukahara et al.(1981, cited 
Cotman & Nieto-Sampedro 1982) showed that classical 
conditioning of cats produced synaptic growths on specific 
cortical neurons. Cotman and Nieto-Sampedro (1982) acknowledge 
the elusiveness of synaptic modification, but they suggest that 
the available data show that behavioural plasticity has neural 
counterparts. This applies particularly to the ability of the 
nervous system to modify its circuitry. It therefore remains a 
reasonable hypothesis that EEG alpha energy might index 
synaptic modification in the 0-P region of the brain. 
Consequently, it appears reasonable to correlate EEG alpha 
energy with qualitative levels of competence. 
The need now arises to account for decreases in energy 
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that are assumed to occur from time to time in the energy of 
synaptic output. It is suggested that these times correspond 
to periods of structural reorganizations among neurons, in 
particular, to the synaptic terminals of their dendrites. From 
the research of Brown, Jansen and Van Essen (1976), Lichtman 
(1977), Purves and Lichtman (1980), Cotman and Nieto-Sampedro 
(1982), and Patterson and Purves (1982), the elimination of 
synapses and the rearrangement of synaptic connections in early 
brain development is now accepted as fact. The mechanism seems 
to be that there is an initial overproduction of synaptic 
connections (Purves & Lichtman 1980), to the point where they 
overtax the spatial synaptic geometry of the cell (op.cit.; 
Hume & Purves 1981, cited, Patterson & Purves 1982). Their 
elimination does not appear to be a random process, as some 
sort of competition exists among them to determine which 
survive (Brown, Jansen & Van Essen 1976). It is assumed that 
synaptic cells secrete chemical agents that contribute to the 
formation and maintenance of synaptic endings (Purves & 
Lichtman 1980). When an imbalance of activity occurs among 
competing inputs it determines which synapses are not 
maintained and therefore, which are eliminated. 
The plasticity of such a process, leading to individual 
differences, can be appreciated. In particular this provides a 
mechanism by which environmental variation and use will 
strengthen specific.neural pathways and selectively enhance 
their survival. While there is strong evidence for this 
process in the neonate, Cotman and Nieto-Sampedro (1982,372) 
report that evidence is now available that suggests synaptic 
growth and renewal are part of the normal operation and 
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maintenance of brain circuits throughout their development. 
In support of this, Cotman and Nieto-Sampedro (1982,379) 
cited an instance where an enriched environment significantly 
increased the dendritic weight and complexity of the occipital 
cortex of rats during an eighty day test period. They 
suggested (op.cit.383), that experience gained with age, or age 
itself, maybe a stimulus for increased synapse number and 
probably synapse renewal. It also appears that this kind of 
developmental plasticity is adversely affected by inactivity, 
however, Cotman and Nieto-Sampedro (1982) suggest that once 
initiated, synaptic contacts can be formed in less than 
twenty-four hours. Apart from repeated stimuli, oscillations 
and resonances within neural networks are obvious mechanisms by 
which afferent signals can be maintained for a sufficiently 
long time to permit a restructuring of the networks. 
There are two other issues of particular importance to an 
understanding of the cognitive competence profile based on EEG 
energies. First, Purves and Lichtman (1980,156), and Patterson 
and Purves (1982,521) report that the synchronous activity of 
cortical neurons somehow impedes their competitive interaction 
compared to those whose inputs fire out of step with each 
other. Secondly, Purves and Lichtman (1980) raise the matter 
of critical periods. They suggest that cellular geometry plays 
a significant role in the selective elimination of synapses and 
that dendritic networks tend to establish relatively distinct 
spatial domains to minimize or preclude competition among 
synaptic endings. A critical period exists when competition 
reaches a maximum and ends when the process of synapse 
elimination has progressed to the point where few, if any, 
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synapses are still capable of competitive interaction. 
If the effects of synchronous synaptic activity, critical 
periods and synaptic plasticity are combined, then a mechanism 
exists that can account for the discontinuous profile of EEG 
data. It is suggested that the highly synchronous activity of 
alpha generators located in the 0-P afferent processing region 
of the brain precludes the kinds of dynamic synaptic 
restructurings likely to occur in say schema storage regions. 
It is further suggested that over a period of several months, 
specific brain structures are not so much turned on (Davidson, 
cited Plomin 1983), but rather selectively accelerated to an 
ultimately higher qualitative level. During this period of 
acceleration, it is suggested that a quantitative synaptic 
addition is made to the generators. This is accompanied by a 
corresponding increase in EEG alpha energy output. The 
addition of synapses is envisaged to continue until a critical 
point is reached, recognized as a new alpha energy peak. At 
this point in time, it is imagined that the spatial geometry of 
the generators becomes unstable and forces a reorganization. 
Such a reorganization is envisaged as an elimination of 
synaptic connections, antecedent to a more effective and 
efficient synaptic structuring. These periods of 
reorganization are viewed as times during which 
de-differentiation of neural structures ensues and which are 
accompanied by a temporary regression. Lorenz (1977,198), 
Werner (1957,139) and Prechtl (1982,104) consider such a 
fundamental restructuring to be biologically sound and 
essential to a developing system. In Lorenz's words, "one must 
regress in order to progress". 
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The reduction in the number of synapses, and the 
associated reduction in energy output ,are predicted to result 
in reduced EEG potentials measured at the 0-P position on the 
scalp. Again, due to the synchronous nature of the generators, 
any changes to them would be expected to take a considerable 
period of time. Consequently, through a repetition of these 
events a profile of EEG alpha energy can be derived which seems 
to be supported physiologically and seems to represent 
qualitative changes in something that might constitute alpha 
generators. 
In the long-view, the ten qualitative changes (Fischer 
1980) envisaged for the period of human cognitive development 
represents a remarkable degree of stability in the 0-P region 
of the brain. A stability that seems essential for a measure 
of constancy in the human ability to process information 
(Cotman & Nieto-Sampedro 1982,389). 
It was suggested previously that changes to EEG values 
might result in ways that prevent their use as an index of 
competence. These need to be briefly considered. Kandel 
(1970,65) proposed that the intensity of synaptic potentials 
may be altered in two ways. First, by a direct change in the 
synaptic current produced, and secondly, by a change in the 
electrical resistance of the cell fibres. Keeping in mind the 
above discussion concerning the dynamics of synaptic 
reorganization, the proposed functional integration of 
synchronized synapses with cell fibres to produce the alpha 
generators and the sampling techniques of Matousek and Petersen 
(1973), it is suggested that the functional model outlined 
above copes adequately with this potential difficulty. This is 
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because of the synchronistic nature and dominance of the alpha 
generators. If single neurons or small localized populations 
only were being considered, then it is suggested that they 
would be more susceptive to change and reflective of 
fluctuations in these variables. 
It seems reasonable that the generators might also 
recruit new neural populations, and hence increase their EEG 
output during development. However, the pattern of EEG data 
then requires an explanation as to why, from time to time, 
populations are abandoned, and why the recruitment program 
generally is logarithmic. These explanations are not 
forthcoming. If neurons were incorporated into the functional 
model of a generator, as outlined above, then the model is in 
no way threatened providing they remain synchronous and partake 
in synaptic reorganization during the critical periods. 
Of more concern to the viability of the EEG profile as an 
index of cognitive competence is the possibility of changing 
electric field strengths due to different rates of growth 
between the skull and brain. Extensive brain growth data is 
not available and with few exceptions (Dobbing and Sands 1973; 
Boyd 1962) does not differentiate for growth with respect to 
cerebral region, chemical component or sex. 
Epstein (1974a,1974b,1979,1980) processed a combination 
of brain and skull data that suggested spurts in growth that 
approximated to those observed in EEG alpha data, from the O-P 
region of the brain. However, McQueen (1982) disputed the 
accuracy of the processing and McCall, Meyers, Hartman and 
Roche (1983) attempted to replicate Epstein's findings using 
eighty subjects from the Fels longitudinal study. Using linear 
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extrapolations and quantitative statistics they failed to find 
the kind of relationships Epstein reported. This paper 
suggests that the difficulty arises due to a lack of 
consideration of sexual dimorphism, in the brain growth data. 
Brain growth data is generally logarithmic and that 
reported by Brierley (1976) reflected a loss of brain weight 
corresponding to each of the regressions observed in the EEG 
data. This data is similar to that reported by Coppoletta and 
Wolbach (1933) and almost identical to that reported by 
Donaldson (1895) and Boyd (1962), when data for males and 
females are averaged. The point of this, however, is that both 
the Donaldson and Boyd data reflect extensive sexual 
dimorphism, which negates the apparent correlation with EEG 
data determined from the Brierely undifferentiated data and 
negates Epstein's findings. 
In a similar way, the most comprehensive data on growth 
in head circumference (Nellhaus 1968) also reflected extensive 
sexual dimorphism, which does not map the patterns found for 
brain growth. When brain and skull growth are mapped the 
patterns reveal considerable fluctuations which can be 
interpreted as density changes. FIGURES 13 and 14 manifest 
sexual dimorphism in density changes. Because EEG alpha data 
from the 0-P region of the scalp do not reflect sexually 
dimorphic patterns (Matousek & Petersen 1973), it is argued 
that the different rates of growth that exist between the brain 
and the skull do not significantly impose on the EEG data. 
This may be due to the fact that potentials measured at the 
scalp are from positions on electric lines of force, of 
non-propagated fields (Holmes & Houchin 1967), emanating from 
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presumably powerful alpha generators located in the 0-P region 
of the brain. 
Although the arguments have been briefly discussed here, 
there is a wealth of neuro-physiological evidence that supports 
a discontinuous profile of EEG activity. This paper suggests 
that cognitive .competence can be indexed by EEG energies. When 
the structures deemed to represent levels are thought of as 
being associated with alpha generators located in the 0-P 
region of the brain, and when thought of in terms of set theory 
structures, this invites a discussion concerning their possible 
relationship with information processing. This appears 
warranted as simultaneous information processing is associated 
with this region of the brain (Luria 1976). 
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THE COMPETENCE PROFILE 
VIEWED IN TERMS OF 
A LURTAN MODEL 
OF INFORMATION PROCESSING: 
It has been suggested in the previous chapters that EEG 
data may be a suitable index of brain changes and hence of 
cognitive competence. When viewed over the long term it is 
suggested that changes in EEG can be considered to constitute a 
profile of cognitive competence. 
It has also been suggested above, that the focus of EEG 
alpha activity centres on the occipital-parietal region of the 
brain. This region of the brain has long been associated with 
intelligence. In particular both Weinstein and Teuber (1957) 
and Ingvar (1976, both cited Epstein 1979,126) suggested that 
the inferior parietal lobe of the brain was developmentally 
correlated with intelligence, while Luria (1966,1976) 
incorporated this region of the brain into a functional model 
of information processing. 
With regard to the connection of the 0-P region of the 
brain to EEG energies, Andersen and Andersson (1968) proposed 
that alpha energy is characterised by attention and problem 
solving, as well as in more efficient perception and 
performance. John (1977), in his review of functional brain 
measures considered EEG energies from various parts of the 
cortex and suggested that the posterior cortical formations of 
the brain engaged in the most complex integrations of 
simultaneous visual, auditory and somatesthetic activity. From 
a structural point of view, Walter (cited Lairy 1975,6B 73) 
assumed that from about the age of nine years, alpha energy is 
represented as a search for pattern. From a totally different 
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perspective Fouts (1983,67) suggested in his theory of 
cognition that the distribution of cognitive processing of the 
organism should be represented in its neurology. From his 
studies he suggested that cerebral white matter is associated 
with simultaneous cognitive processing, while grey matter is 
associated with sequential processing of information. This 
needs to be viewed in terms of the previous chapter, where it 
was suggested that the 0-P region of the brain has higher 
concentrations of white matter (Gur et al.1980), which in turn 
correlated with higher EEG energy outputs. 
There are, however, three aspects of alpha generators 
which warrant consideration with respect to a Lurian model of 
information processing. First, the connection between the 
discontinuance of alpha wave production and attention. 
Secondly, the proposed location of alpha generators, 
occipital-parietally, in both hemispheres and thirdly, that the 
proposed ten levels of cognitive operation (Fischer 1980) can 
be structurally and mathematically viewed as a hierarchy of 
more complex integrations of simultaneous visual, auditory and 
somatesthetic activity. 
Luria (1976) developed a functional systems approach to 
cognition which is concerned with the processing of information 
within cerebral hemispheres. His work is based on extensive 
psychological testing of brain damaged patients and was 
primarily directed towards the prediction and location of brain 
lesions. The success of his predictions, based on repeated 
observations, led him to a unique view of the functioning of 
the human mind. He visualized three interrelated, but 
psychologically separate blocks which can be described 
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functionally as: arousal, coding and planning. 
Block 1 consists of that physiological section of the 
brain concerned with arousal which includes the brain stem, the 
reticular formations and the hippocampus. The function of this 
block is the regulation of the tone and waking state of the 
cortex. When low levels of cortical arousal are experienced 
the functioning of the higher level blocks, two and three, may 
also be adversely affected. 
Block 2 is situated in the posterior parts of the cortex, 
specifically in the occipital, temporal and parietal lobes. 
This block functions in the obtaining, processing and storage 
of information. Like the other blocks, it is hierarchically 
arranged into designated areas: primary projection, secondary 
associated and tertiary or over-lapping areas. The tertiary 
areas are of importance as they receive information from all 
other modalities and Luria suggests that they are the basis of 
symbolic behaviour. In particular, the tertiary areas of Block 
2 engage in two sorts of information processing: simultaneous 
and successive. .These concepts in themselves are not unique, 
as each has a firm basis in Kantian philosophy and Einsteinian 
physics, but the psychological connection Luria makes is most 
original. Kirby and Biggs (1980,133) describe simultaneous 
processing as the integration of information into a 
quasi-spatial gestalt, where all parts of the information are 
immediately surveyable and relatable, thus combining details 
into one simultaneous whole. This simultaneous processing is 
assumed to take place in both cerebral hemispheres, in the 
occipital-parietal areas, and involves both verbal and 
non-verbal tasks. Successive processing of information, is 
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assumed also to take place in both hemispheres, specifically in 
the fronto-temporal regions of the brain. These areas effect 
the integration of unrelated information into a temporal 
sequence, such, that meaning is achieved only in terms of the 
result of the whole sequence. 
Block 3 is located in the prefrontal lobes of both 
hemispheres where it assumes an executive role and appears 
responsible for the planning and programming of behaviour. In 
addition to this inputs from other blocks are received. Block 
3 appears responsible for the setting of goals, the planning of 
process strategies and actions and it also appears to determine 
if goals have been successfully achieved. For instance, in 
answering a question, the occipital lobe is the receptive area 
for visualizing words, while the frontal lobe directs 
activities making possible the expression of an answer. 
There is also close interaction or feed back between 
Blocks 1 and 3. This is important, for while the former is 
fundamental for arousal, the latter regulates that same arousal 
(Kirby & Biggs 1980,134). In effect Luria (1976) has 
demonstrated a combination of all three functional units of the 
brain and their involvement in cognitive performances, such as 
perception, attention, memory, speech and thinking. 
With regard to a Lurian model, the connection between 
Blocks one and three is manifest in the EEG data. This is 
because alpha wave activity is associated only with a brain in 
tone. When the eyes are open and attention is concentrated, or 
the individual is excited or engaged in information processing, 
then the alpha waves are replaced by low-voltage, rapid, 
irregular waves. More fundamentally, however, interruptions to 
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the normal functioning of information processing is observed 
when lesions occur in-the 0-P region of the cortex, especially 
to the dominant left hemisphere. Such lesions lead 
specifically to a disturbance of the simultaneous organization 
of stimuli (Das, Kirby & Jarman 1975; Luria 1966). From an 
electroclinical point of view, Lairy (1975 6B-78) cites EEG 
abnormalities, such as focal spikes or paroxysmal discharges, 
especially in the occipital, parietal and temporal areas of 
patients, whose common factor is the existance of relational  
difficulties of adjustment and adaptation. 
Finally, the kinds of structures Fischer (1980) proposes 
for levels, expressed in terms of increasingly more complex 
control of relationships between elements in sets, and 
ultimately to more complex sets and the relationships among 
them, suggests a form of simultaneous processing. It is 
suggested that the set theory structures defined by Fischer 
(1980), as representing the qualitative levels of cognitive 
operation, when analysed, constitute a crude mathematical 
approximation of the logic implicit to the simultaneous 
processing of information. 
In view of the above assumptions, it is reasonable to 
assume that a centre for simultaneously processing information 
is located in the occipital-parietal region of the brain, as 
suggested by Luria (1976). But this paper goes further and 
suggests that it is also a reasonable assumption that the 
simultaneous processing of information might be indexed by EEG 
alpha energy. In this way the competence profile might be 
interpreted in terms of the structures underlying the 
simultaneous processing of information. 
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T H E P ERFQ R MAN CE P RO F' I L E 
CRITICAL REVIEW 
F I SCHER '- S IDA. T 
As Fischer, Pipp and Bullock (1984,105) pointed out, two 
components are necessary in an attempt to detect developmental 
spurts. The first component involves the use of an appropriate 
method that reveals any discontinuity or break in an otherwise 
continuing pattern of data; suitable techniques to achieve 
this, were discussed on page 14. The second component requires 
a careful consideration of the environmental conditions under 
which developmental discontinuities are likely to be observed. 
Because these two conditions have not been simultaneously 
incorporated into research paradigms the literature is scarce 
in reporting developmental discontinuities. 
Fischer and his colleagues are engaged in a series of 
cross-sectional experiments (Fischer,Hand & Russell 1984; 
Fischer & Kenny, in press) using the method of multiple tasks, 
previously described, to test a hypothesis (Fischer & Pipp, 
1984) about environmental conditions for discontinuities. 
"According to the hypothesis, when individuals 
develop a new cognitive level, their abilities do 
show discontinuous change. The spurt is evident, 
however, only in optimal performance. With familiar 
materials, the opportunity for practice, and the 
provision of environmental support for high-level 
skills, performance becomes optimal, and development 
shows a spurt as a new level emerges" 
(Fischer, Pipp & Bullock 1984,105). 
A new emerging level will be manifest in a broad range of 
domains (Fischer & Pipp 1984), providing appropriate 
environments are available. Fischer's research area includes 
the cognitive, social and emotional domains. Although, only 
the cognitive domain as represented by arithmetic will be 
considered here. This domain was selected by Fischer, because 
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it is a standard topic of instruction in schools (op.cit.), but 
it might also have been chosen because the structures inherent 
in the arithmetic tasks can be more easily analysed and checked 
against the set theory structures of the skill levels being 
investigated. 
Fischer's sample consisted of ninety-six subjects, four 
of each sex, for each year, from nine through twenty years of 
age. All of the subjects came from the white middle-class 
student population of Denver, Colorado. 
Tasks for level eight abstract mappings consisted of 
"eight problems requiring explanation of the relation between 
two similar arithmetic operations (addition-subtraction, 
addition-multiplication, multiplication-division, or 
division-subtraction) and the application of that explanation 
to two concrete computational problems (such as 7+3=10 and 
10-3=7 for addition and subtraction)" (Fischer, Pipp & Bullock 
1984). For level seven, single abstraction tasks consisted of 
"six problems requiring the definition of one of the arithmetic 
operations (addition, subtraction or multiplication) and the 
application of that definition to a concrete computational 
problem, such as 7+3=10 for addition." (op.cit.106). The tasks 
for the level six representational system have not been fully 
analysed or reported as yet, and they are a little more 
difficult to interpret. This is because six tasks involving 
the operations of addition, subtraction and multiplication were 
required of students in grades three through six, while another 
two division items were required of students in grades seven 
through fourteen. This data will be discussed in two parts. 
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Fischer's study in progress investigates students' 
performances on the above tasks under four environmental 
conditions which vary in degree and which were designed to 
ultimately effect optimal performance. Optimal performance is 
a theoretical concept which is assumed to correspond with the 
best possible level of performance an individual can produce. 
Whereas Fischer et al. discuss only the two most extreme 
environmental conditions from their study (Fischer,Pipp & 
Bullock 1984; Fischer & Pipp 1984), this paper considers, as 
well, the intermediate conditions which are available for level 
eight. The data is interpreted in regard to it constituting 
performance profiles which reveal patterns of change in 
performance as a function of age. 
The first data collection session consisted of two parts. 
Initially, students were given the arithmetic tasks for the 
selected Skill level without any assistance or opportunity to 
practice or prepare for the test. This environmental condition 
was called the spontaneous condition. Later in the first 
session, students were shown an appropriate response for each 
of the test items. They were then environmentally assisted by 
instruction, task practice, and supportive feedback prior to 
retesting. This environmental condition was termed the 
Practice and support condition. At the end of the first 
session, students were encouraged to practice the arithmetic 
tasks on their own, prior to the second session. The second 
session took place two weeks later. In the first part of the 
second session students were again required to answer test 
items without any assistance, while in the second part of this 
session they were environmentally supported to the same extent 
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as in the first session. Fischer's prediction was that a 
dramatic spurt in performance would be observed for the 
practice and support condition (although he does not make it 
clear whether this is applicable to the first, second or both 
sessions) with little evidence of an emerging spurt for the 
spontaneous conditions. While the data show the predicted 
patterns this paper differs in its interpretation of them. 
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Figure 15. displays the pattern for level eight 
performance on the arithmetic tasks, drawn point to point. The 
dashed line for the first session's practice and support 
condition has not previously been reported by Fischer et al.. 
It should be noted that the second session's spontaneous 
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condition has not been graphed, as it is similar to that 
session's practice and support condition. For the first 
session, the difference between the two conditions is quite 
dramatic. The spontaneous condition shows almost nil 
performance at fifteen years and then performance steadily 
increases to some forty percent success on items, at age twenty 
years. The practice and support line (dashed) displays the 
predicted spurt in performance at fifteen years and its 
relationship to the superimposed relative alpha energy curve in 
terms of peaks and troughs is apparent. It is suggested, that 
the additional two weeks practice, prior to the second session 
tests, exceeds reasonable environmental support. Under these 
conditions it seems that performances may reflect other 
components of the brain, apart from information processing, for 
instance, memorization. If this is so, then performance 
presumably reflects elements of "rote" memorization, without 
necessarily an enhancement of learning. This appears to be a 
reasonable explanation for the difference between the two 
support and practice conditions at level eight (FIG.15). 
It should be noted that performance for the support and 
practice condition reflects the same regressions as displayed 
in the EEG alpha energy. Fischer et al (ibid.107) invoke a 
"second-spurt" hypothesis to account for this. They suggest 
that when the initial emergence does not result in 
"near-perfect" performance then a second spurt will occur upon 
the emergence of the next developmental level. Their 
reasoning, however, is compatible with the arguments put 
earlier in this paper in support of regression. They suggest 
(ibid.108) a second discontinuity occurs, "because the skills 
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for the earlier level undergo consolidation and differentiation 
when they are reorganized at the new level" (see also Fischer 
1980; Flavell 1971). 
While this view is seen as being reasonable, it is 
suggested that it is not so much a matter of "when it occurs", 
but rather "it occurs" as a natural function of cognitive 
development. This paper suggests that a skill (Fischer 1980), 
at a particular level, is ultimately controllable only from the 
end of that period of reorganization and differentiation. This 
point in time is predicted to occur for the various levels, 
(level six onwards), from the companion EEG alpha peak 
associated with each of the levels (see FIG.8). For each 
level, performance will plateau at this time at nearly one 
hundred percent, providing the environment is supportive of the 
performance. This can be seen to occur at approximately 
nineteen to nineteen and a half years for level eight, in 
Figure 15. 
Finally, the minor peak at thirteen years (FIG.15) is of 
interest and without data can at best be speculated upon. In 
the discussion of performance at the next levels, it will be 
suggested that an enhanced peak, at a level prior to the one 
being tested, probably reflects inappropriate test items. If 
the performance data for that year group is enhanced by the 
performance of a few students, then it implies that these 
students are located in a class, two year groups below their 
capacity. On the other hand, as the phenomenon is extensive 
throughout the performance literature, it is suggested that it 
may be a manifestation of the interaction of the alpha-1 and 
alpha-2 generators referred to previously in this paper. 
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In Figure 16, the patterns for level seven performances 
are shown and again donsiderable difference is seen between the 
spontaneous and support conditions. 
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Fischer, Pipp and Bullock (1984,107) report that for the 
spontaneous condition only the spurt between fifteen and 
seventeen years is statistically significant, i.e. to one level 
(8) beyond the level of the test item (7). However, this paper 
cautions that the qualitative nature of the changes implicit in 
both competence and performance tends to underscore what might 
be of statistical significance. If it is assumed that the unit 
of measure of a quality effectively changes, as the quality 
itself changes. 
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A point of significant departure in interpretation exists 
for the level seven practice and support data (FIG. 16). 
Fischer and his colleagues imply that the continuation of the 
spurt, through ten to eleven years, to some sixty-six percent 
correct performance, constitutes the level seven spurt. This 
paper suggests that this is part of the level six spurt 
magnified out of proportion due to inappropriate test items and 
artifacts incurred during testing. It is suggested that the 
test items (Russell & Fischer, in press) for this level do not 
sufficiently differentiate from those at level six, 
particularly for addition and subtraction. Further to this, 
the same students had already performed the level six test 
items (communication, Fischer 1985). This would have both a 
compounding and a confounding effect at level seven and again 
Fischer et al. invoke their second-spurt hypothesis. It is 
suggested that the so called second-spurt in this instance is 
really the level seven spurt, while the true second-spurt is 
observed to occur at fifteen years of age. 
It is again important to note the concurrence of the 
pattern for level seven performance, with respect to the peaks 
and troughs of the superimposed alpha energy curve. Moreover, 
the one hundred percent performance plateau for level seven 
skills occurs at about fifteen and a half to sixteen years of 
age. This coincides with the companion EEG alpha energy peak 
(FIG.8) for level seven and the point from which single 
abstractions can be controlled in supportive environments. 
The level six performance data is shown in FIGURE 17. 
The most significant thing to note about this data, apart from 
the fact that it is treated in two parts as previously 
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mentioned, is that performance is near ceiling level from the 
start for the support- and practice condition. The only 
interpretation that can be given to this is that the test items 
were inappropriate and too easy. This in itself suggests that 
at least in part, the interpretation given to the level seven 
data is correct. 
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With a little imagination, a rise to, and a regression 
from, a level six peak in performance can be seen to 
approximately coincide in time with the level six EEG alpha 
energy peak. Considering that elementary division problems are 
included as test items for students in grade seven upwards, 
which was not the case for level seven items, the slight 
regression in performance from the level seven peak at thirteen 
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years is both predictable and observable. 
When it is cons-idered that Fischer's performance data are 
for school grades (average age is approximated by adding six to 
grade), and that data are plotted point to point, there is 
considerable agreement between the peaks and troughs for both 
performance profiles and competence profile, based on EEG alpha 
data. Remarkably, from age nine through twenty, the average 
displacement for the three peaks; levels six, seven and eight, 
is approximately seven months. The age from which a level is 
controllable is also displaced, but by a lesser amount. This 
needs to be viewed from the perspective that for performance 
data, spurts occur at approximately the same age for all eight 
subjects tested, at any level (Fischer & Pipp 1984b). While 
some comparisons can be made between the Swedish EEG sample and 
the Denver performance sample, regarding socio-economic status, 
it is suggested, that the timing of the peaks does not appear 
to be dependent upon this to any great degree. 
In effect the agreement between the optimal performance 
profiles exhibitOd above and the competence profile based on 
EEG data (FIGURE 12), suggests that it is a reasonable 
hypothesis that performance profiles reflect the cognitive 
component of a collaboration between individuals and their 
environments, when the learning environment is manipulated to 
induce their best performances 
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EVIDENCE CONSISTENT WITH 
A PROFILE OF DISCONTINUOUS 
COGNITIVE PERFORMANCE: 
The pattern of data or cognitive performance profile 
obtained from Fischer's investigation into the levels of 
performance demonstrated under different environmental 
conditions needs to be considered relative to other performance 
data. In particular performance data need to be viewed in 
terms of the assumed periods of regression in cognitive 
performance. It also needs to be seen if other performance 
data might permit an extension of the profile derived from 
Fischer's work so as to map the extent of the cognitive 
competence profile derived from EEG data (FIG. 12). 
Probably the first indication of discontinuous 
performance, which appears to imply a regression in behaviour, 
is the disappearance after some months of the archaic reflexes 
in the neonate (Mounoud 1982,125). Kagan (1982,6; 1983) also 
cited fundamental behavioural changes in neonates. He reported 
that neurophysiologists have detected three major changes in 
EEG wave form at three, eight (theta energy) and twelve to 
twenty-four months. These wave changes, he suggested, imply 
morphological or functional changes to the central nervous 
system which correlated with the onset of behavioural changes. 
This is supportive of Fischer's (1980) first three levels of 
operation, and suggests the possibility of a link between 
performance and EEG. 
Piaget (1972) describes behaviours associated with the 
structures of thought. Following the acquisition of language 
and the semiotic function, actions are interiorized and become 
representations. Even so, Piaget claims internal actions 
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during this period are "preoperatory" and lack operational 
logic until the age of seven or eight Viewing this with 
reference to an extrapolated performance profile this age (7/8 
yrs.) correlates, not with the 'L peak but rather with the time 
from which 'L skills can be controlled, providing they are 
environmentally induced and supported. 
Behaviours associated with "operations", however, involve: 
"a logic of reversible actions.. .characterized by the 
formation of a certain number of stable and coherent 
structures, such as a classification system, an 
ordering system, the construction of natural numbers, 
the concept of measurement of lines and surfaces, 
projective relations (perspectives), certain types of 
causality ...,etc." 	(Piaget 1972,3) 
Piaget proposes that these behaviours conform to a period 
between 7/8 and 11/12 years. In this case, when compared to 
the performance profile, the behaviours associated with this 
period fall precisely between the point of 'L control and the 
point of d'L control, and are defined by the 
[ 	] skill structure (Fischer 1980). 
The next major behavioural change, according to Piaget, 
is a decisive turning point. A new logic emerges which is 
accompanied with: 
"the capacity to reason in terms of verbally stated 
hypotheses and no longer merely in terms of concrete 
objects and their manipulation" 	(Piaget 1972,3). 
Piaget observes that these behaviours conform with the period 
11/12 to 14/15 years. Again, with reference to the performance 
profile, this corresponds precisely with the period between the 
control of L skills and the control of .7 1-. skills. The 
behaviours, during this period are defined by the .71._ structure 
(Fischer 1980): 
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Piaget (1972,7) acknowledges the influence of 
environmental stimulation in terms of quality and quantity on 
the retardation of cognitive performance, whereas, he makes no 
provision for regressions in cognitive competence. 
Bearison (1974,26) suggests that this is a weakness in 
Piagetian theory. He hypothesizes that the use of a construct 
like "successive stages of operativity" would imply a 
regression in both an individual's competence and not merely in 
his performance. 
Neuro-physiological justification for regressions in 
competence have already been discussed in this paper, however, 
regressions in performance appear throughout the literature in 
many domains, including the affective (Monge 1973; Montemayor & 
Eisen 1977; Harter 1982; Greenspan 1979; Crain 1980). 
Unfortunately, there are some difficulties with interpretation 
of the cognitive performance data because seldom are the 
degrees of environmental support or practice applicable at the 
time of data collection, reported. Even so, there is extensive 
agreement among performance data in general with the 
performance profile derived from Skill theory considerations, 
irrespective of whether it is viewed from the perspective of 
peak performance or from the perspective of regressions. 
Flavell and Wohlwill (1969, cited Bearison 1974,25) seek 
recognition for transitional periods between the points in time 
at which logic structures are "first-in-competence" and which 
they are "always-in-performance". The logic of the argument in 
this paper would change the emphasis from 
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"always-in-performance", to "always-in-competence", and hence 
"always-in-performance", providing the structures are 
environmentally induced and supported. 
This transitional period is recognized in the literature. 
Strauss (1982) cites five categories of explanations for 
regressions in behavioural growth. Logically, these centre on 
the relation between the phases of the behaviours: Phase 1, 
when the behaviour appears; Phase 2, when it disappears; and 
Phase 3, when it reappears. Several of the explanations can be 
dismissed as being transitory or artifactual in nature and thus 
fundamentally non-cognitively developmental, while others are 
extremely nativist in approach. This paper suggests that the 
collaborative interaction of individuals with their environment 
and the mechanistic explanation of synaptic reorganization that 
results from the collaboration, alluded to previously, is an 
adequate explanation of the phenomenon. In this regard, 
cognitive performances at Phase 1 and Phase 3 are suggested to 
be developmentally related through cognitive competence 
structures. Performances appear to be similar at Phases 1 and 
3 and it is suggested that they can be represented by the same 
mathematical structure (Fischer 1980) for practical purposes. 
It should be kept in mind, however, that the structures of 
competence are embedded in different neurological structures 
and are thus likely to have a different meaning, even though 
performances appear to be similar. This perspective of 
regressions in cognitive performance is consistent with the 
views of Bever (1982), Strauss (1982a), Bowerman, Emmerich, 
Gardner, and Winner (cited, Strauss 1982b), and Mehler (1982), 
Stavy, Strauss, Orpaz, and Carmi (1982) who place it in the 
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traditions of Piaget, Werner, and Vygotsky. 
In general, the, performance data presented by Renner and 
Stafford (1976), reflect the peaks and regressions that appear 
to map an extrapolated performance profile (based on Fischer et 
al 1984) from the 9_ through '5 1- peaks. Also on Piagetian 
tasks, Shayer, Kuchemann and Whylam's (1976) performance data 
manifests regressions from the d.L, 71_, and c'L peaks. 
In particular, the 41- peak can be observed in Mehler's 
(1982,283) work, while regressions from this peak are also 
noted by him, as well as by Bever, Mehler and Epstein (1967, 
cited Bever 1982,177). In addition, Mehler records a 
performance peak corresponding to 'L, as does Garcia and 
Trujillo (1979) who, together with Mounoud (1982,124) also 
demonstrate a regression from it. Moreover, the dq- peak and 
regression are extensively mirrored in the literature and 
several specific examples are cited: Carey (1982), Dasen 
(1982), Johansson (1977), Mann, Diamond and Carey (1979), 
Shultz and Coddington (1981) and Thompson (1982). Meanwhile, 
the 'L peak is demonstrated in data reported by Dasen (1982), 
Shultz and Coddington (1981), as well as by Radel (1982), whose 
data also reflects regressions from this peak. 'Vygotsky (see 
Zender & Zender 1974,37), on the other hand, refers to this 
period as the crisis at age 13, when a decrease in children's 
mental capacity can be explained in terms of a shift from 
object discernment to understanding and deduction [see also 
Cattell's comments on reduced gf (fluid intelligence at this 
age), (cited Epstein 1974a,213)]. 
Extensive references are cited in Fischer and Silvern 
(1985,633-636), outlining cognitive behaviours consistent with 
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levels of development from the first sensory motor level 
through level seven and beyond into adolescence. 
As mentioned in a cross-cultural study, Dasen (1982) 
investigated several of Piaget's concrete operations. Some 
aspects of which he discussed, relative to discontinuities and 
regressions in cognitive performances. 
However, it is not clear from his report, but assumed, that his 
results refer to the spontaneous test condition. This does not 
prevent the data from being assessed in terms of culturally 
supported, or not supported environments. For his study, Dasen 
selected three eco-cultural populations: "(1) Eskimos (Cape 
Dorset) at one extreme (nomadic, hunting, low 
food-accumulating, low population density); (2) African 
agriculturalists (Adiopodoume) at the other extreme (sedentary, 
high food-accumulating, high population density); and (3) 
Australian Aboriginies (Hermannsburg) in an intermediate 
position but definitely on the nomadic side. Three Piagetian 
tasks were used to assess the development of topological, 
projective and Euclidean spatial concepts." (ibid, 222). 
Where it can be argued that a cultural relevance to a 
specific task exists, then the data reflects a performance peak 
in the vicinity of 'L, followed by a regression, then an 
advance towards either the 'L peak or towards an asymptotic 
plateau. This is assumed to be indicative of a level six 
performance task. On the other hand, where the cultural 
irrelevance of the task can be argued the cultural order of the 
data is reversed and reflects as a rising curve similar to 
Fischer's spontaneous condition. In several cases the pattern 
reaches an early asymptotic plateau which Dasen suggests 
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represents a "performance" rather than a "competence" measure. 
This accords with the - arguments previously advanced in this 
paper and probably represents a lack of practice on the test 
items and, hence, a less than optimal performance. 
The cross-cultural data is viewed as supportive of the 
- performance profile developed in this paper from Fischer's 
data. More importantly, however, it suggests that the profiles 
are not simply artifacts of either northern European and 
middle-class American environments, or of peoples from 
basically European stock. Earlier in this paper it was 
suggested that if the peaks and troughs could be shown to be 
common to all peoples, then it might be a reasonable 
hypothesis, to suggest that competence structures are 
genetically embedded. This hypothesis is a little less 
— ominous, if competence structures place only age limitations on 
peoples' ability to process information. 
Almost without exception where tasks used in performance 
assessment can be struc-tually analysed d assigned a level 
according to Fisbher's set theory (1980), and this includes 
most of the Piagetian tasks, the data reflect the pattern of 
peaks and troughs displayed in the Fischer et al (1984) 
performance profiles. 
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PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF THE PROFILES 
FOR SCHOOL-LEARNING: 
A visual comparison between the competence profile 
derived from EEG data (FIGURE 12.) and performance profiles 
(FIGURES 15, 16 & 17) derived from Fischer's data can now be 
made. With respect to the form and synchrony of the profiles 
it can be seen that an acceptable mapping of the two profiles 
ensues. In other words, within reasonable limits, the peaks 
and troughs of one profile synchronize with the other. Becau se 
of this synchronization either profile, competence or 
performance, may be presumed to fulfil a function, as a 
profile, which reflects a pattern of change for cognitive 
development. 
In view of the linear relationship between Skill level 
(as defined by Fischer 1980) and age (FIGURE 7), it is not at 
all surprising that much of the effort used in attempting to 
determine the rules and conditions of learning have focussed on 
quantitative, linear, hierarchical and continuous sy6tems. 
However, it is only the peaks that constitute the linear 
function and as such, the function must therefore be regarded 
as being discontinuous. Furthermore, although the levels are 
qualitatively defined as being one unit apart, in this paper 
they are also quantitatively related to the exponential 
function, 	raised to the power of relative alpha energy. In 
other words, this paper suggests that the real "measure" 
between levels is not constant. This supports the commonly 
held view that levels of cognitive competence represent a 
qualitative aspect of cognitive developmental change. The 
implication of this suggests that where qualitative changes are 
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involved this presents mathematical difficulties for both the 
statistical analysis and assessment of students' performances. 
It has also been suggested that competence might be 
viewed as an index of the qualitative logic processing 
component of the brain. When considered in this way, 
. competence takes on a role something like Piaget's (1970,722) 
"structure operatoire d'ensemble". However, there exist 
significant differences from this Piagetian construct. First, 
in that the structures should be considered as undergoing 
periods of regression in the cause of efficient development. 
Secondly, in that the structures might only be reflected in 
performances that are both environmentally induced and 
supported. While a state of competence may exist at a 
particular point in time, providing students with the capacity 
to construct skills (Fischer & Pipp 1984,14) performances must 
be constructed anew for each environment. For practical 
classroom purposes though, COthpetence structures assist 
predictions to be made concerning the potential of synchronous 
. behaviours in various content domains. When learning tasks are 
selected in this way it may result in learning being more 
readily transferred to new domains. 
As Fischer suggests throughout his work, the order of 
competence structures, in this case from the profile, enables 
predictions to be made concerning the sequence of skill 
development that an individual will follow. The mathematical 
structures associated with cognitive levels (Fischer 1980) and 
underlying performance tasks can assist in curriculum design. 
• In designing a curriculum for groups of students the profile 
may provide structural parameters for predicting what might be 
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reasonable performance expectations and a guide to arranging 
the sequence of content. The profile is likely to be of more 
use in this way, if the parameters can be shown to be 
associated with logic structures underpinning the ability to 
simultaneously process information. In addition, the profile 
might also aid in assisting teachers to determine the level at 
which to pitch their teaching in order to create stimulating 
learning environments. 
The discontinuous nature of the cognitive competence 
profile appears to enable predictions to be made concerning 
periods of performance decrements. 
In designing a curriculum for groups of students this 
point seems to negate the traditional linear or hierarchical 
curricula structuring. Consequently the profile emphasizes the 
need to incorporate periods of content revision into the 
curriculum design, perhaps along the lines suggested in 
Bruner's (cited Bigge 1976,266) "spiral curriculum". Revision  
of course, is often built into courses of study. The cognitive 
competence profile at best offers a theoretical justification 
for revision. Given the dynamics of competence changes for 
individuals and the environmental dynamics of classroom 
situations, teachers at least need to be sensitive to the 
possibility of periods of performance decrements which their 
students may encounter from time to time throughout learning 
experiences. 
Assuming that under suitable environmental conditions the 
performance profile mirrors the EEG competence profile, then 
• from a practical consideration, only two criteria need to be 
met in order to index a student's competence; i) appropriate 
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test items and ii) appropriate environmental conditions. 
Simple as this sounds, it belies the ease of either adequately 
structuring appropriate items, or establishing environmental 
conditions that approach an optimal level. 
It would seem desirable to monitor students' cognitive 
development on a frequent basis using tasks designed to assess 
Fischer's skill levels. However, it needs to be kept in mind 
that the set-theory structures associated with skill levels 
(Fischer 1980) can at best be thought of as mathematical 
approximations for physiological cognitive structures. Also, 
it needs to be recalled that a period of some six years appears 
to exists between the emergence of a new level (e.g. levels six 
& seven) and the eventual control of skills at that level. 
Consequently, in view of the above and of the suggested 
--- dynamics of both the competence and environmental components of 
behaviour, it appears that regular and reliable Skill 
measurement may be difficult and time consuming to obtain, in 
the day to day asessment of peTfor-ManCe. Under these 
circumstances Skill assessment may become impractical for 
classroom situations. To overcome these difficulties, simple 
indices  more appropriate to observation, rather than testina, 
might be considered. In this respect the SOLO taxonomy (Biggs 
and Collis 1982), although appearing to confound skill levels 
via overlapping significant features of the developmental 
profile, as indicated in FIGURE 12., appears to provide 
appropriate and relatively simple techniques. SOLO levels 
present as a practical means of day to day monitoring of the 
quality of a student's collaboration with his environment. In 
this respect SOLO appears to integrate a person's competence 
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with his environment in the overall assessment of the quality 
of his performance. There is also a suggestion of a 
relationship between SOLO and the simultaneous processing of 
information (ibid.193). This appears to make the use of SOLO 
more appropriate, in view of the connection suggested earlier, 
between cognitive competence levels and the simultaneous 
processing of information. 
It must be stressed that-both the cognitive competence 
and performance profiles are based on normalized 
cross-sectional data. Consequently they at best represent 
development for groups of students and can not be viewed as 
prescriptive of any individual. 
When adequately tested an individual of known age can be 
located relative to the cognitive competence profile. 
Furthermore, there appear to be two majot - variables in this 
matter. First, the timing of the acceleration to a new 
qualitative level of competence and secondly,, the rate of 
achieving the new level. With -respect to the first variable, 
there is surprising agreement among the performance data, cited 
in the previous chapter, concerning the age of emergence of new 
levels. Prima facie, this factor does not seem to play a 
significant role in determining individual differences. The 
second factor, however, appears to be a logical candidate, for 
affecting individual differences, particularly, when viewed in 
terms of synaptic plasticity and the structuring of neural 
pathways dependent upon environmental experiences. 
If an individual is located, relative to the normalized 
profile, then any environmental decline will effectively cause 
that individual to be relocated, vertically down from where he 
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was previously. Consequently, an individual's performance 
under reduced environmental conditions, is logically assumed to 
be reflected in poorer levels. 
The emphasis this paper suggests is on changing 
environmental conditions to accommodate individual differences, 
as opposed to a changing students to accommodate to rigid 
environments. In this respect, Fischer, Hand, Wilson, Van 
Parys and Tucker (1984,55), suggest that early preschool 
children require little environmental support to perform at the 
level of their competence. Whereas, from the age of four, 
increasing environmental support and encouragement is required, 
in order for children to display their best performances. 
Bullock (1983,106) and Fischer and Bullock (1984,115) present a 
convincing argument in the Vygotskyan tradition that suggests 
that higher cognitive skills develop through social 
interaction. From this point of view, the role teachers need 
to play in the learning environments they 'create for their 
students is one of the "master craftsman where learning might 
be achieved throOgh":guided reinvention" (ibid 115; Lock, 1980). 
In other words, through students and teacher interacting 
t t . throughout goal-directed activities. 
The objective of education is to effect learning and 
consequently to change behaviour. Thus, the arguments advanced 
in this paper support the view that learning environments need 
to be manipulated so as students' performances reflect their 
competence. 
While this paper has some misgivings in general to the 
concept of mental growth and in particular to Epstein's (1974b) 
treatment of some eleven independent studies (ibid 220) to 
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suggest a normalized incremental relationship with age, a 
remarkably good (inverse) correlation results, in terms of 
peaks and troughs, between Epstein's mental growth profile and 
the cognitive competence profile FIGURE 12. 
This paper suggests, however, that Epstein 
(1974a,1974b,1978), Epstein and Toepfer (1978) and Toepfer 
(1979) are mistaken in their interpretation of the data and in 
their suggestions for reorganizing middle grades educational 
policy. At the risk of over simplifying their argument they 
suggest that during periods of slow brain/mental growth, 
learning should be deferred until more suitable periods of fast 
brain/mental growth. They also suggested that these periods 
can be determined, for individuals, simply from different rates 
of skull growth. It could be that the misinterpretation occurs 
as a result of a confusion between the qUantitative and 
qualitative aspects of the profiles. 
The interpretation offered in this paper suggests that 
the periods of so called slow development should not be assumed 
as periods of no development per se, but rather the 
regressions in competence might be viewed as placing 
limitations on the ability of students to qualitatively process 
information. There is no suggestion from the available 
performance data that these periods place any restrictions on 
the ability of students to quantitatively extend learning in 
any domain or domains. The restrictions that appear important 
to what is learnt, or might be learnt, appear to be the 
structural limits placed on competence and environmental 
constraints applicable at the time of learning. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: 
The opening premise to this paper adlopted the common view 
that cognitive development might best be considered as a 
collaboration between the cognitive structures of the human 
mind and its working environment. Reinterpretation of both 
physiological data related to the human mind and performance 
data extracted from the literature seemed to support this 
premise. Performance was noticeably improved when 
environmental conditions were improved. In itself, this is 
obvious, but the reinterpretation of data suggested that the 
patterns of change in performance, mirrored changes that 
occurred in the brain; when brain changes were indexed by EEG 
energies, and people were encouraged to give their best 
performance. Furthermore, physiological indices suggested that 
cognitive competence structures regressed priorto the 
emergence of more sophisticated structures. These regressions 
were observed to be in phase with regressionsin students' 
performances. 
• 	In seeking: suitable index of the cognitive competence 
component of behaviour this paper selected the EEG, primarily 
because EEG was seen as an index of the energy changes 
associated with a brain in tone. Consequently, under these 
conditions, the brain was viewed as being primed and ready to 
commence processing information. Matousek and Petersen' 
(1973) EEG alpha data were reinterpreted from the perspective 
of it being a discontinuous function of age. While peak alpha 
energies were found to be a function of the natural logarithm 
of age, the overall function was resolved into a logarithmic 
component and two oscillating components. These latter two 
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components were fundamental to the arguments presented in this 
paper. They were suggestive of powerful alpha generators being 
located in the occipital-parietal region of the brain. While 
this possibility is raised in the literature, little 
significance or interpretation has been attributed to them. 
From energy considerations these generators appeared to have 
periods of predominance which corresponded in time with the 
concrete and abstract stages of development, as elaborated by 
Piaget. Energy changes to the generators appeared to 
correspond in time to levels of change in cognitive 
performance, as elaborated by Fischer (1980). Following the 
attainment of a level, the generators declined in their energy 
production prior to accelerating to a new higher level of 
production. These periods of decreased energy production 
seemed to correlate with periods of poorël. cognitive 
performance. Because indications were, that the generators 
might be located in the 0-P region of the brain, they were 
interpreted as perhaps engaging in the simultaneous processing 
of information, as articulated by Luria (1976). 
A model of possible alpha wave generation was proposed, 
and the synchronous nature of the generators was advanced as 
reason for their resistance to more rapid structural 
reorganization. This suggested a stability in the processing 
region of the brain which seemed essential for providing a 
degree of constancy in the interpretation of information. 
The discontinuous view of alpha energy production 
suggested the interpretation that neural structures are 
quantitatively added to until they become unstable and 
reorganize. The result of this seemed to be a new qualitative 
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level of operation. Moreover, these periods of structural 
reorganization enabled predictions to be made concerning 
decrements in students' performances along the lines elaborated 
by Bever (1982) and Strauss (1982b) and as displayed in 
Fischer's performance data. 
When peak alpha energies are attributed skill structures, 
defined by Fischer (1980) as being one, qualitative unit apart, 
the function with age became linear (FIG.7). Under these 
conditions it is not surprising that cognitive development has 
been assumed to be both continuous and linear. However, it was 
only the peaks that constituted the linear function and as 
such, the function must be regarded as being discontinuous. 
Furthermore, although the levels were qualitatively defined as 
being one unit apart, in this paper they were also 
quantitatively related through EEG alpha energy. Qualitative 
changes in students' competence have been assumed to present 
mathematical difficulties for both the statistical analysis and 
assessment of students' performances. 
The educational implications of performance decrements 
suggested that revision is needed to be specifically built into 
courses of study, rather than to be something that was 
traditionally done because it was believed to work. 
Additionally, the cognitive profile can act as a guide, along 
the lines suggested by Fischer (1980), for the sequencing and 
synchronizing of content material and as a basis for the 
rationale of mapping a curriculum to individual needs. It also 
provides an explanatory power for understanding an intervention 
into the learning process. Considerations implicit in the, 
cognitive performance profile supported the common view of 
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environmental constraints restricting efficient and effective 
learning. It therefore concurred with the common practice of 
establishing supportive learning environments and placed 
emphasis on the need for practice. 
It was proposed that qualitative outcomes from learning 
experiences can be observed, as opposed to constantly being 
tested. Furthermore, it was suggested that SOLO levels (Biggs 
& Collis 1982) can be interpreted with respect to the profile. 
The SOLO taxonomy provides an appropriate and relatively simple 
technique that evaluates the integration of cognitive 
competence with prevailing environmental conditions and enables 
a qualitative assessment of changes in performances. 
An emphasis is suggested on changing environmental 
conditions to accommodate individual differences, as opposed to 
changing students to accommodate to rigid environments. The 
normative, and cross-sectional nature of the data and 
correlations preclude suggestions concerning individuals. For 
this reason, aspects of the correlations cause concern and 
require specific follow-up research. In particular, the 
profiles need to be investigated for a longitudinal sample. 
Furthermore, the competence and performance profiles are 
derived from independent samples, whereas, to be really 
convincing both profiles need to relate to the same sample. As 
well, the connection between the structures inherent in 
cognitive levels, mathematically defined by Fischer (1980) and 
the simultaneous processing of information requires empirical 
investigation. 
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